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over

described the levels
of oil and

spills caused by tanker transportation is rare or unlikely according to
showed that after the passage of the Port and Tanker Safety Act in 1978,
and pipelines have decreased.
Anderson, president of Get Oil Out, testified that GOO has now the safe development
major concern. Spills continue to happen in spite of improved safety
and improved training. There wiU always be spills as long as the
described the effects and costs of a tanker platform collison, similar to those
in the Gulf of tv1exico.
more stringent liability laws and more effective equipment
the Channel should be regulated and limitations should be placed on the
the Channel.
coordinator of Santa Barbara County Emergency Services, described
to identify the plan for the risks of offshore oil operations.

Jurisdiction

are the major problems in such planning.
Edward Grace, chief of Marine Safety for the 11th Coast Guard District, discussed
response in all waters off Southern California. Overall contingency plans have been set
plans for every pollution incident. Each incident may have unpredictable events
flexible.
Coast Guard is the Federal on-scene coordinator in charge at all oil spills. The

if

respond first and bear the costs.
was asked if the vessel traffic lanes should be extended to the West around
can effectiveLy contain oil spills in open water.

He replied that

extended completely because of the lack of visual aids, and that weather and sea
make oil containment equipment ineffective.
Cudd, of Vandenberg Air Force Base, pointed out that the Air Force

no

and no capability to respond to an offshore accident. It can provide
to

and its hospital facitities could help.
Peterson, of the Santa Barbara County Fire Department, said the County's strong

concerns are

low frequency, high magnitude events. Fire response plans call for an oil industryat Gaviota and a fireboat.
for dealing with a large oil fire is in San Francisco and Los Angeles.

are not

may not respond to local concerns.

Santa Barbara County does not have

or capability to deal with the problems.
Oil Spill Response plan gives the California Department of Fish and
agency in oil spills. Captain Edward Simons of Fish
Department uses that authority and the decisions it must make. The Director of Fish and
chairman of the Interagency Oil Spill Committee.
rehabilitates organisms damaged in oil spills. There are three sites on the coast
b

and otters.

Money is needed to equip these facilities. SB 686 and SB 959 could
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Marie DeSantis, formerly in the fishing industry and presently an author and writer for The
National Fisherman, expressed the view

the

conditions often found in the open seas.
vessel

does not exist to pick up spilled oil in

She

that

a state-of-the-art cleanup

by the oil companies, recovered only one percent of the oil spilled in the
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Towed out to sea, the vessel broke in half

The stern sank and is still

oil; the bow was safely

thousand barrels of oil were spilled.
y, he recommended increased

more

better understanding of coastal current regimes and designated areas in which
to tow

boats.

recommendation.

should pay for

Dr.
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that the Santa
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needed to realize

and

accidents.

of
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representing the

that the

California Association of Governments,
the

is

of oil

It is difficult to read and evaluate

risks of fires and

Pipelines
jargon used in the EIS/EIRs

on the pipeline
Mr. Burl Waage gave the history of Clean Seas, a consorlium founded in 1970 and supported by

16 oil companies.

Although

effort must be made,
Seas was

likelihood of a significant spill today

extremely remote, every

to deal with such an eventuali

the best available

to do this.
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Clean

Clean

Mr. Clean I, and Mr. Clean II must be capable of recovering oil
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20-knot winds. They are also rapid response craft which can deliver
a very short time.
are held at least twice monthly and are monitored by government agencies.

The

inerals Management Service evaluate the industry's ability to contain and clean
has evaluated the ability of Clean Seas to deal with offshore oil spills.
has reached the upper ability to mechanically contain spilts. Research is now
on methods of chemically and biologically dealing with spilled oil.
Rochte, of the California Conservation Corps, described the resources the Corps can
in case of emergencies. In one to four hours, the Corps can provide personnel and

to

spills. They have responded to three large oil cleanup operations in the last
Hansch, of the California Coastal Commission, was concerned about the risks of
and gas operations. The Commission requires that offshore oil facilities mitigate all risks,

it

ment and training to do this.
must be upgraded. Oit spilt containment and cleanup equipment is effective only in
seas.

The accumulated risks of offshore drilling and tankering must be evaluated

thresholds and risks established.
Rogalin, also of the California Coastal Commission, gave the statistics of 38
from 1969 to 1979. Statistics can be interpreted in different ways. For
a vessel explosion in port are given as once in 80 years. However, there were
ports in the last few years.
measures to prevent oil accidents involve training, inspection and equipment. Local
facilities and acquire equipment such as fireboats.

Legislative

and enforce safety standards.
Scherb, a consultant on marine safety, stated that management must be made
for safety. Modern technology can provide data banks and black box recorders to monitor
and catch problems on ships and platforms before a disaster happens.

Rather than

completed projects, the philosophy should be to improve initial design.
testified regarding CAORF (Computer Aided Operations Research Facility)
since 1976. Its equipment can simulate any vessel in any location.

By modeling

movements of ships and simulating the perspective of the vessel captain, data can be obtained
that can determine the levels of risk involved. Safer procedures for vessel handling and vessel traffic
can then be designed.
Gordon Cota, a Santa Barbara fisherman, reported that the American Flag vessels
encountered in the Channel have well-trained professional crews. The big problem is that of foreign
vessels
if

no English-speaking crew members.

He pointed out. that the best technology does no

mistakes are made.
Aspland, of Area Marine, recommended a strong organization of terminal operators,
-5-

merchant marine, and local government to set up operating procedures and environmental protection.
Existing legislation and regulations are sufficient. The key is enforcement
Technology exists to meet the requirements of safe marine transportation. The human
is the unpredictable part of the system. Good people must be continuously
Dr. Jean-Louis Armand, chairman of the Department of Mechanical and Environmental
Engineering at UCSB, told how Norway, in the last decade, has become the leader in the

of

advanced offshore technology. A levy on offshore oil produced supports the work of groups such as
Det Norske Veritas.

They establish standards for the construction, operation, and inspection of

offshore oil structures. He suggested that a similar group, drawing on the expertise of the University
of California, be supported in this region by government and industry.
Senator Hart, Senator Marks, and Professor Armand discussed the taxing mechanism used in
Norway to support their research.

There is some timid support for such work

this country, but

more should be done.
A statement by Professor Marshall Tulin, of the Ocean Engineering group at UCS8, was then
read. He recommends that a Center of Expertise be established in the State of California to study
the risks of offshore oil operations.

He believes it is important to conduct such studies before

accidents happen.
Dr. Floyd Tuler, of the \llechanica! Engineering Department at Worcester Polytechnic Institute
in Massachusetts, discussed the use of risk analysis in the management of offshore oil operations. It
can help set policy and establish priorities. Conflicts can be resolved.
Risk analysis is not a panacea for management of oil operations. It has limitations and, being
based on probability, it is different from most conventional engineering analysis. It is a useful tool
for identifying and mitigating hazards.
Mr. Clair Ghylin, of Chevron Oil Company, took the position that we have enough laws and
regulations governing exploration and production in the OCS. He recommends more coordination and
cooperation between industry and all levels of government to insure that those regulations work
effectively.
He described the large number of permits that must be obtained before starting offshore oil
operations and the time and money involved. The situation is ongoing and volatile and much analysis
is necessary. Voluntary cooperation using existing methods is to be preferred to new legislation.
Senator Hart, Mr. Ghylin, Mr. Trout, and Mr. Dunaway discussed training and certification for
offshore oil workers.
Mr. Robert Salient of the Sierra Club, called for the streamlining of existing procedures, not the
creation of additional requirements.

Putting many conditions and regulations on paper does not

guarantee their effectiveness. What is needed is a joint powers agreement among existing agencies
that could cross jurisdictional lines. There are now three sets of authorities dealing with the region
from coast to open seas.
Ms. Marty Blum, of the Santa Barbara League of Women Voters, pointed out that the present
case-by-case planning process is part of the problem. It does not allow for long-range consideration
-6-

impact of offshore oil operations.
League recommends that planning for accidents be thoroughly coordinated by
involved.

The Coastal Commission should be funded and local air quality must

of

general public addressed the Subcommittee.

Pennington, of World Oil Products, described a hydraulicatly operated valve to
stem. Present valves operate manually and might not close in time to prevent an accident.
George Silva, a consultant in emergency planning, discussed the nature of risks and the
all-encompassing risk analysis of offshore oil operations. He recommended that
some oil-generated revenues be committed to such a comprehensive analysis that would
the entire State, and the oil industry.
Michael McDermott, who holds a 2nd mates license in the U.S. Merchant Marine, gave some
standpoint of a professional mariner who has sailed on West Coast tankers.
human element is still the key factor. If men are tired and stand watch too often

too

they are more prone to make mistakes in judgment.. The human element enters
in accidents. A mariner is not going to incur salvage and tow expenses that may cost
if any alternative seems possible. Expensive safety procedures are frowned on by coast

management.
It is often difficult to use ship-to-ship radio effectively to prevent possible collisions.
extended past Pt. Conception and safety zones must take into account the maneuvering
oceangoing vessels.
are often not reported and dishwashing soap is used to disperse them. Bilges and
are

out at sea.
recommended a Santa Barbara port authority that would deal with the problems of the Santa
roadstead. It would give better regulatory control and permit effective inspection.
Geoffrey Chung, of the UCSB Environmental Health and Safety Office, commented on
The campus, because of its unique proximity to oil operations, is exposed to
severe accidents such as fires, air pollution at toxic levels, and oil on its beaches. There
coordinated contingency plans to deal with such accidents.
Hart thanked his colleagues on the Committee and the hearing participants.
major issues that emerged during the hearing: Jurisdiction is a problem. Who is
at an accident and who makes the decisions? National and international bodies are involved
communication and coordination with them must be established.
are existing regulations to be enforced? There must be better understanding of what is
and what conditions are being imposed.
nmittee is concerned with funding of the Coast Guard and with research on the risks

oil operations.
sea lanes around Pt. Conception should be extended and fire prevention and firefighting
must

improved.
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The Puerto Rican incident must be carefully studied for insights as to what happened and what
steps should be taken in this region to prevent such disasters.

-8-

HEARING PARTICIPANTS:
Captain Vince Agapedo
Santa Barbara County Fire Department
4410 Cathedral Oaks Road
Santa Barbara, CA 93110

Ms. Diane Guzman

Mr. David Anderson
Get Oil Out, Inc.
Post Office Box 1513
Santa Barbara, CA 93102

Susan 1-lansch
California Coastal Commission
631 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105

Dr. Jean-Louis Armand
Marine Science Institute
UC Santa Barbara, CA 93106

Dr. Michael Herz
Tiburon Center for Environmental Studies
Post Office Box 855
Tiburon, CA 94920

Mr. Jerry Aspland
President, Area Marine
300 Oceangate LAC1571
Long Beach, CA 90802
Mrs. Martha Blum
League of Women Voters
1217 -A De La Vina Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
Mr. Don Cornett
EXXON USA
111 W. Micheltorena Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93105

Mr. Bruce Lee, Coordinator
Emergency Services, County of Santa Barbara
105 East Anapamu Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
Chief Richard Peterson
Santa Barbara County Fire Department
4410 Cathedral Oaks Road
Santa
CA 93110
Mr. Carmen Pizzarieilo - CAORF
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
Kings Point, NV 11024
Mr. Tim Rochte
California Conservation Corps
Post Office Box 1380
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406

Colonel George
Director
Environnental Task Force
Vandenberg Air Force
CA 93436
Ms. Marie De Santis
327 A Vallejo Street
Petaluma, CA 94952
Mr. Tom Dunaway
Pacific OCS Region
Minerals Management Service
1340 w. 6th
244
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Mr. Clair Ghylin
Chevron Oil USA
600[ Bollinger Canyon Road
San Ramon, CA 94583
Captain Edward Grace
Chief, Marine Safety
11th Coast Guard District
400 Oceangate
Lorg Beach, CA 90822

Ms. Suzanne Rogalin
California Conservation Corps
631 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
Mr. Maurice Scherb
Box AG
Beverly Hills, CA 90213
Captain Edward Simons
Department of
and Game
1416 Ninth
Councilman Archie Snow
415 Diamond Street
Redondo Beach, CA 90277
Mr. Robert Sollen
825 Soledad A venue
Santa Barbara, CA 93103

-9-

Mr. Horace Pennington
World Oil Products
2550 Eastman Avenue, 118
Ventura, CA 93003
Mr. George Silva
27 La Fletcha Lane
Santa Barbara, CA 93105

Questions regarding this hearing or this report should be addressed to:

or

Mr. Arent H. Schuyler
Environmental Studies Program
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93106

-10-

9:15 a.m. Senator Gary Hart called the hearing to order. He welcomed members of the L

and thanked the hearing organizers.
Present at the hearing table
Senator Milton Marks,

Senator Hart:
Francisco

Assemblyman Jack O'Connell, Santa Barbara
Senator Dan McCorquodale, San Jose
Mr. Barry Schuyler, Lecturer, Environmental Studies Program, University of California at
Santa Barbara
Mr. Jerry Seedborg, Consultant to Subcommittee
CHAIRMAN GARY HART: Oil and gas development by its very nature is a hazardous activity
with inherent risks such as spills, fires, and escaping gases; and too oflen, legislative bodies only get
involved with such issues after there is an accident or problem.

Today we will try to gather

information from a broad group of participants and experts as to how we can best prevent such
accidents from occurring and how to deal with them should they ever occur.

We're looking for

recommendations for the State of California to help insure the safest possible environment in which
oil and gas development can occur. Certainly here in this area we have seen a dramatic expansion in
activity in the Santa Barbara Channel by both the Federal Government and new lease sales proposed
by the State Lands Commission. We're hoping today to utilize the Santa Barbara Channel and Santa

Maria Basin as a case study as to how these problems can and should be addressed.

Session I
An overview of oil operations in the region for the next 25 yenrs: Risks and consequences of
accidents.
Panelists: Diane Guzman -Santa Barbara County Department of Resource Management
James Trout - State Lands Commission
Tom Dunaway- Mineral Management Service (MMS)
Don Cornett - Exxon, USA
David Anderson - Get Oil Out, Inc.
MS. DIANE GUZMAN: This is a summary of offshore activity in Santa Barbara County and a
review of existing development, proposed development, local review process and the manner in which
risks are assessed.

Santa Barbara has had offshore oil development since the 1880s with wooden

platforms offshore Summerland. In 1929, we had the first leases in State waters; in 1958, ! he first
offshore platform, Hazel; in 1969, the now famous oil spill; and since 1982, an unprecedented amount
of offshore oil projects.

Existing facilities are show on the overhead.
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We currently have 19

in State
about

3 marine terminals, 5

eo million cubic feet

of gas and 80,000 barrels of oil per

facilities.
in Federal waters with another 15 theoretical,
proposed in State waters; plus additional ones if
approved 1 consolidated marine terminal, 2
coast. We are planning for 2 consolidated sites in the
gas and 500,000 barrels of oil per day at the peak. So you can see
proposed activity.
We have been in the permitting phase, and still are in the permitting
1982. These are only the major projects. Actual construction won't start
for any production to come on-line in 1988 and 1989. We have

but there is still time for additional factors to be built into these
County review process can be summarized with a couple of statements.
aggressive local participation, and we have spent over $12 million in
doing major studies. We will have had 20 major projects to

we

Federal Government and State Government in joint review
both Federal and State participation.
there have been extensive conditions; in

In each of
many cases, over

project. Many of these address the risk situation.

y

we have addressed are pipeline transportation,

Among the risks that we have studied are geology,
biology, fishing and offshore uses, system safety and reliab
Federal and State studies has been from the government,
oil companies.

geology, we have looked at site selection, consolidation
platforms, pipelines, on and offshore facilities, pier and loading areas,
restructuring.
we have studied the issue of pipeline transportation and found it to
asked for the best available

v

and asked for the minimization of onsite

we

to those essential for production.
vessel traffic corridors, limited the use of chemical
moorings, no construction during whale migration and efforts to
freshwater biology: pipeline inspections, spill contingency plans, avoidance of
air monitoring, slope stabilization, replanting, and erosion control.
usage: minimize offshore production, response time and re-estab
lanes and the need lo remove construction scars.
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kelp

System safety and reliability:

We studied fire stations
waste

weather surveillance and
risks (e.g.,

human exposure to areas

by-products, and
Del Mar School).
Conclusion:
aggressive local role

We need

has

our role is to review

review of large local

facilities and the permits associated with those, we have expanded
panel is a substantial improvement and brings the
together.

substantially. Joint

of

Extensive studies have required comprehensive conditions, enforcement,

programs, and periodic updates as we learn more about
CHAIRMAN HART:

What is

monitoring

situations and

time frame for

barrels per day by 1992 or 1993.
MR. JAMES TROUT: The State Lands Commission
oil-related accident can occur; and

on the

its inception

an

the Commission has

active in

preventing accidents and developing rules and regulations coupled with onsite
In the Santa
existing

area, production is

25 are currently produc

We have 19

next 25 years, we will see the resumpti'ln
the

from 5

leases. In the

some of the leases that are not now producing,

that were formally leased and quitclaimed

next 20 years we
were

10 percent per year; from 40

of the Pt.

in

to

the

Arguello eight tracts

We need to

and were since
This

to the State.

the

from drlll ships,

seaport

facilities, marine tanker terminals and pipeline.

In

the Commission

the

that the best way to

a

has been done
critical

it

and enforcement.

are shut down such as when weather and sea
ineffective~

containment and recovery
oil

was to
make oil

or

containment or cleanup vessel available.

there is no
are times when critical

are not

at times when weather is not
The

we've

contain information on

of

oil

cleanup equipment,

and onsite containment

blow-out prevention equipment and

safety

H2S environment and daily monitoring of drilling and
We have been

on adopting one set of

of

Safety

in an

well work.
so we

in

one set of regulations rather than two.
The Commission has been on the
with onsite inspection and

with

proposed marine terminal safety program and

and control for over
full

it for three years,

years

and
manual written and

for all State-leased

We've had a

was not authorized by the Legislature after the Federal funding
and is not in effect at this time. No one is now inspecting

we

to inspect them. This is one area that the
safety and analysis for which the
step in production safety. We are now working on
in 1983 that includes cleanup and containment
for the State and Federal agencies involved in these drills; a full-time
sea state and temperature data collection, such as Diane mentioned, and
on whales and sea otters and fish eggs and larvae.
we see at this point, and the role that the State has taken in preventing the
accident.
How often do platforms close down in the event of bad
area, and how often does it occur?
answer that, but maybe Mr. Don Everitts, who is in our
can answer that.
: We have not done it yet, but the regulations are posted on the
HART: What is the criteria for a platform to shut down?
If seas are too high, or we can't test or bring materials out. No

are satisfactory.
operations are not done, such as removing drilling bits
holes, or after holes.
Are you familiar with Section 8574 dealing
to

followed by anyone who owns or operates a

products in the territorial waters of this State.

Procedures must

plan written that will reasonably prevent an oil
operations in the territorial waters of the State. If a spill does take place,
must deal with mitigating measures.
of

This oil spill contingency plan must be

Resources Agency and any such vessel operation who

to f

an

is guilty of a misdemeanor. Now how do you comply

This act applies to the Department of Emergency Services, but Pd

happy to

get back to the Committee.
plans for our marine terminals and offshore platforms, by our
should

MARKS:

as

at this Section because it's existing law, and I don't

with.
We do have the Office of Emergency Services on our next panel, so maybe
comment.
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SENATOR MARKS: Mr. Trout, what have you found out as a result of the questions that I
asked you?
MR.

TROUT~

at the time

you referred to concerns oil

The

into the

and was

It

crude carriers were being contemplated

very

Lands

authorizes the Governor to create a State
Commission, Resources

Agency~

and

Department of Oil and Gas, Department of Fish and

Office of Emergency Services; and they have been working with the various companies to

a

marine

Statewide Oil Spill Contingency Plan and plans for each individual oil
terminals and platforms. I hope that answers your question.
SENATOR MARKS:

I'm sorry, that doesn't.

The law says:

Anybody who transports oil without such a plan approved

You must file an oil spill
Agency or

the Secretary of

designee is guilty of a misdemeanor. That's the law. Are you complying with the
MR. TROUT: To the best of my knowledge, we are complying with the law through the
Oil Contingency Group which is established in the Resources Agency which involves all the agencies
that I mentioned.
SENATOR MARKS: You received from each oil company an indication of what oil they're going
to transport, yes or no?
MR. TROUT:

We have a contingency plan for each State platform and each marine terminal

that's on State water.
SENATOR MARKS: You're really not answering my question. It says an oil spill plan must be

filed. Now, is an oil spill plan filed?
MR. TROUT:

Under the Oil Spill Plan, the State operating authority in charge is the

of Fish and Game. It's always been our policy that the locai. government is in charge of

the scene's operations, and State and Federal people support them.
SENATOR MARKS: What did you do in the

incident? What activity did you

for those of you not in Northern California, was a very serious loss of a
and a lot of oil.
MR. TROUT: Senator, I'm sorry, I'm from the Los Angeles office, and I am not familiar with
the activities up there.
MR. TOM DUNAWAY:

morning,

Hart and members of the Subcommittee on Oil

and Gas Development. I am the regional supervisor for

operations, Pacific OCS Region, located

in Los Angeles, California.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and amendments of 1978 authorize the

of the

Interior to administer the provisions of the Act pertaining to the leasing of the OCS and may at any
time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he deems to be necessary and proper to
provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of natural resources.

AdditionaHy, .•• the

Secretary shall cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government and the affected states.

The

Secretary has delegated his authority to the MMS. For OCS operations off California, Oregon and
Washington.

MMS responsibility is carried out by the Pacific OCS Region in Los Angeles, and two
-15-

on two areas: first, give an overview of OCS oil and gas operations
and second, highlight of MMS's responsibility for minimizing risk,
with accidents on

OCS.

shelf, and that is the lands three miles on out.
be taking place in the next fifteen years or so
Maria Basin, we have analyzed current activities, proposed
activities based on our current knowledge and current leasing.
OCS operations are in Southern California.

There are, in the Santa

Maria Basin, 12 platforms and 1 o.ffshore storage and treatment vessel
3 platforms currently being installed. Production averages currently 80,000
are 2 mobile drilling units working in the Santa Maria Basin, and currently none
Channel.
include plans of development for 8 platforms that have or will be

y

MMS for review. These platforms will be installed over the next five years to
estimated at 354,000 barrels of oil per day from the OCS.
hypothetical activity is just a guess.

However, our educated

success or failure of exploration activities and future leasing
on

our more optimistic scenario is an additional 12

b

326,000 barrels of oil per day.

ocs
80,000 barrels of oil/day
ms

354,000 barrels of oil/day (peak 1990-1992)
326,000 barrels of oil/day

35 platforrns

164,000 barrels of oil/day (app.

!

of 1990 peak)

activity would remain fairly constant at between two and four
time

the Santa Maria Basin and/or the Santa Barbara Channel.
and complete arsenal of laws and regulations, orders, and personnel to
accidents in OCS operations. OCS Lands Act as arnended mandates
to require the use of the best available and safest technologies

22 to enforce safety and environmental regulations; specifically to
safety equipment designed to prevent and ameliorate blowouts,
major accidents, and periodic inspections without advance notice. Additionally,
Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of the department in which the U.S.
are given authority to promulgate regulations and investigate accidents.
promulgated, in 30 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 250, entitled Oil and Gas
_;_;_:;____;.;:c;..........;__"-"-....;;_;;;.;.....;;..;...;.,;;;._;;__.:..;...;;,.:;__;;;;_=-::..,

requirements for leases, procedures for accident investigations, and
violations. Next, the MMS has issued specific OCS orders that go

on

design, equipment, testing, and maintenance must
-16-

used by

operators in the OCS.

the

These are very similar to what Mr.

Commission.
We have one more significant area, and that is a
platform verification.

in California must undergo this
CHAIRMAN HART: Are those

a Federal program.

MR. DUNAWAY: This is

CHAIRMAN HART: We have no platform verification requirements within State waters?
MR. TROUT: I'm not sure what you mean

platform verification.
of the

MR. DUNAWAY: Our platform verification program is three parts. It covers
platform, the fabrication of a platform, and the installation of a
the

a recommendation

in one of

an independent

then goes onsite and monitors and reviews either

to

The
areas.

expert

design, fabrication, or installation of our

platforms, prepares a report which is then submitted to the MMS.

We have our own

who

review that report to see what indeed the design, fabrication, or installation of the structures are in
accordance with appropriate standards.
CHAIRMAN HART:

is no such for program for the

So, Mr. Trout, to your knowledge

State?
MR. TROUT: Well, we do have sor:1e activity.
MR. DUNAWAY:

ru

ask Torn to respond to that.

These orders also reference accepted industry standards,

as

A PI's

recommended practices, National Electric Code, American Society of Mechanical Engineers'
standards, and many more.

Additionally, MMS issues safety alerts as a quick way of informing

of accidents or of

unsafe acts.

To tie this all together, the MMS's
who are in the field

Region has 14

utilizing three helicopters

a year. These men, who average more than fifteen years of

inspect every OCS operation at least every two weeks or sooner, and visually
witness and record the

of every safety device. Platforms may have over 1,000 such safety

devices.
As I previously stated,

Department of Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

shared

responsibilities and safety regulations and accident investigations to promote safety, avoid
duplication, and less

of Interior and U.S. Coast

signed a memorandum of understanding

1980.

Briefly, the USCG is responsible for the design of floating
the

have

personal safety, and has

in death and injury investigations. The MMS is responsible for design of fixed structures, and

drilling and production systems, and has the lead in fire and explosions investigations. In the
OCS, the MMS and Coast Guard have an excellent and

arrangement.

In 1969, the only significant accident (in the Pacific OCS) occurred: the Santa
Since that time, over 500 wells
only 100 barrels spilled.
million

ific

blowout.

been drilled, 300 million barrels of oil have been produced, with

Last year only 10 barrels were

with

cleaned up, and over 30

produced. This remarkably good record is due in part to the myriad of
-17-

dedication to safe operations. The MMS, the industry,
want nothing less than the total commitment to safe, accident free operations.
Thank you, Senator Hart, members of the Subcommittee.

I am

Manager with Exxon's Western Production
our overall view of future oil and gas
will address the potential risks of these operations and safeguards
by the regulatory agencies and the industry to mitigate these concerns
These concerns have been raised by projections of the future
you've heard about already this
statement.)
ANDERSON: I am David Anderson, President of Get Oil Out. l
statement. (See Exhibit "C" for the full statement from GOO.)

the jurisdiction for dealing with such accidents?
industry and all levels of government?

What is the

and

Who has the resources,

Barbara County Emergency Services Coordinator
- Regional

of Region I, State Office

Edward Grace - Chief of Marine Safety, 11th Coast Guard District
Cudd- Environmental Task Force, Vandenberg
-Santa Barbara County Fire Department
Simons - Department

Fish and Game
iem for on/offshore emergency is serious. We work
and building hazards.

We also hire

to

measures include:
emergency operation plans to utilize our best available options and develop
plans.
Performing large-scale exercises and evaluations before and after the plan is adopted to
concerns, roles, communications, technical aspects, and how to respond.
oil industry's plan and interface it with the County's plan to identify aH
and make sure oil companies are capable of responding.
need

better definition of on/offshore responsibilities in regards to offshore
-18-

emergency response. There is a need to assess how much we rely on State offices such as DES.
CHAIRMAN HART:

What's the worst case

Does it deal with

or

technology?
MR.

roles

Jurisdiction is our greatest problem; coordination and

and actual emergencies is risky.
CHAIRMAN HART: Does the State need to take more control?
MR. LEE: The State's excellent. We need to have them define more roles.
MR. JAMES ALEXANDER: The State DES has a small

important role in the event

spills. There is a warning control system in Sacramento, from which we notify the appropriate state
and local agencies. The Department of Fish and Game is actually the lead state agency in case of oil
spills.
CAPTAIN EDWARD GRACE:

The 11th Coast Guard District is responsible for

prevention and pollution response in Southern California.

The elements of doubling the number of

rigs and increasing tanker traffic, expected groundingst fires, and spills have all become important,
and the Coast Guard will have involvement in all of these activities.
This morning I will limit my remarks to pollution response, because the Coast Guard will
have an active role in this. Our jurisdiction comes from the Federal Water Control Act, where the
Federal Government developed the National Contingency Plan, which is a joint efforl between the
EPA and the Coast Guard with an understanding between the EPA, Coast Guard, Minerals
Management Service, and several State agencies.

However, the Coast Guard is responsible for

coastal areas because we are the agency with preassigned Federal on-scene coordinators who are
responsible for pollution incident response.
On each level in the response community are jurisdictional matters that are generally spelled
out in contingency plans. The first of those contingency plans is a national contingency plan. There
are regional

for each Federal region; and in each of these, on-scene coordinators are responsible
local

Each plan spells out a coordination procedure for communications,

relations with industry, and for any other government agency that would be involved. This ranges
from

agencies to local county and city organizations. We do not have plans or describe in del ail

what lockstep reactions have to be in a pollution incident.
unpredictable events.
written.

Each plan has to protect against

Any oil spill response always shows that that is the way a plan should be

These plans also recognize an important point that the spill belongs to the

government is

to provide that the cleanup is accomplished. Therefore, spillers are required

to respond first; the Coast Guard is basically a first-aid responder.
assumed is a very large spill; tanker traffic, grid failures, etc.

type of spill that generally is
First-aid response could never be

designed lo stop these kinds of spills, only to keep them under control until so\Oething can be
Who is in charge?

As stated below, the Coast Guard is responsible as the Federal on-scene

coordinators to be in charge. In our position, we should monitor an industry's cleanup. If that doesn't
happen, we take charge in cleanups.
equipment;

In that same act, we would not be involved with our own

we would contract it out, except for our National Strike Team.
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if known, will be required to pay the bill
Water Pollution Control Act would have to be used. I am not
on the status of
Budget cuts have on your ability to
severe restrictions, the size to be determined

cut.

ing lanes mandatory, rather than advisory? Should we
They are advisory. The effort to extend the lanes was modified six
because there are no visual aids at that end of shipping lanes.
To what extent are you familiar with the Clean Seas
Seas ineffective?
a physically difficult work space; containment
What is the frequency of these rough conditions?
Outer waters with 6-foot-plus seas occur 60 percent of the time or more.
CUDD: Vandenberg Air Force Base has no jurisdiction offshore; therefore,
nor any capabilities to respond to an offshore accident or incident. We
between our fire departments and the County fire departments
is geared to a large aircraft-type fire, or a structural or wildland
to respond to a ship or offshore-type situation.

Our hospital is a

limited to stabilization of patients, as agreed with County
with two to three med-tech crews available. Those

are

on a platform or operating a rescue hoist, and we do have the capab
water to assist anyone in the water, but this is basically a da
to our command post.
PETERSON:

Santa Barbara oil development is a novel thing for us to be

we have taken an aggressive task, both onshore and offshore, and marine
atte.11pt is to get zero loss through design, process controls, maintenance
detection systems and suppression systems, both activated systems
The standards that we have used are taken
industry standards.
low frequency, high magnitude events.

The concerns that we

local
most

So far, we have been successful in

a fully equipped station at Gaviota for oil processing facility
fully funded by the oil industry. We have fire protection safety plans on the
new

require emergency response plans.

We have a condition that would call

which is a fireboat in this case. Our onshore firefighting system is
systems employed with research determining what is available.
marine firefighting is that the only capability locally is in San Francisco, and
is not local. We have built-in systems which the vessels are required to have if
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are

Francisco and

they are involved in picking up the product. The

and would not be
situat

concerns. We are concerned about

responsive to our
and

of conflicts

we don't have

In Santa

or

the

nor do we
the terminals will be in place, we hope to be able to

concerns.

CHAIRMAN HART: If a similar situation

incident, how would

we put out that fire?
CHIEF PETERSON: Depending on where it occurred, if on
a local concern,

or drifting

would

we would be the lead agency. Again,

of dealing with that.

sea, it is

Coast

no

concern.

MR. EDWARD SIMONS: I will comment on how
with oil spills specifically.

we
Department of

and

We have fallen into a role of response since the 1970s, after the 1969

incident in this area. Today, we have more than 300 field officers throughout the

of California.

Southern California now has a spill response alternate to my position, Lt. Reed Smith in
responsibility comes from the

Oil Spill

Plan which

the

of the

In addition to

State operating authority role and the State agency, coordinator role.
enforcement on oil spills, as we have

Our
we

1945.

According to Section 5650, it is a criminal misdemeanor. The fine is a very minor thing. But
the offense is criminal, and therefore, does attract a lot of

when it is used.

We

have

Section 2014 which says for damages to the resources by an oil spill, there will be a civil recovery by
the State of California and that is regularly enforced.
order of

Our

and

Our concern has

ficance on the maps that
maps.

been given an

are to prevent and minimize the effects of oil

containment devices around critical
the most.

Bill 686, we

We

and wildlife habit.als can

in groups

use for

do

for areas of critical

responses; the

and industry

these

involved in the decision of whether or not to use dispersants to reduce the volurne of
reach an area. This has to be weighed biologically and what the effects of

that

might be because if we

"'"''"""'"' the oil into the water column, the oil

moves somewhere else

The oil then

resources, even though we

not

as

oil

ashore.
We also

in rehabilitation of

the California Coastal
that have

we have
prov

cleaning equipment in them.

We have three others up and down the coast.
Vandenberg

us

trailers

some Federal energy

One of those is

ered

Barbara.

We are currently involved in

to utilize their sewage treatement plant as a

facility, with some monies we are trying to

from various sources.

We have also worked recently on sea otter
otter range. We have three potential cleaning sites
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a

to

coast in sea
sea otters at

Aquarium, and at our Department of Fish and
Monterey. The problem with those is that we have no funds to buy
We have been negotiating with the MMS offshore
and

included that money in there.
is the official chairman of the Inter-agency

This Committee of 13 State agencies is primarily
State operating team gathers. This Committee has no
plans.
Bill 686 (Marks) and the funding mechanism of Senate Bill

are

is happening in State oil and spill response. These give funds to the
Oil Spill Committee. A study of dispersant and oit effects on
biologists would like to look at a larval form that occurs off our coast,
ocean waters.

We could possibly match funds at this time

provide a full set of maps for the coast of California, and a gas
capability at our water pollution control lab in Rancho Cordova. This
receiving Federal funding from the OCS AG monies.
us 1,610 times in 1984 from their ocean controller with reports of sp
State.
Could you comment on the Puerto Rican incident?

You

is a spill. What happened with the Puerto Rican?
of the emergency event went from the Coast Guard to
Within

1!

hours, we had half a dozen

We had three days of the threatened spill. Initially we geared
that there was no oil spill, but the vessel was
State had a limited jurisdiction. Three days later, the stern
by

we

on-scene coordinator to use dispersants. At that point,

though it was not in the territorial waters of California, dispersants
!'-lational Contingency Plan. I was not available to determine the use of
into sea otter range.
ined agencies, Federal and State, at the request of the on-scene
Bay, we held meetings on a daily basis and
the oil appeared to be moving offshore rather than towards shore, so there was
dispersants. Three days later, we had a phenomenon that is explained as a
oil from its prior position, which was 20 to 24 miles southwest. In
miles north.

The next time the agency saw the oil, it was around the

the real State response with State Parks working with our wardens
bringing them into cleanup facilities.
same time, we had active involvement of the Water Board and Fish and Game in
Y of

to be returned to port. We had a two-pronged spill here. In most spills,
.:J..2-

the source is abated and everyone can concentrate on the cleanup.
people because we

This is where we diluted our

responding to cleanup at the same time we were actively involved

the State oil spill cleanup. We negotiated the conditions to be met for the forward part of that vessel
to be brought back into State waters, eventually to San Francisco

and to dry dock.

took

until November 18. There was not a day during this period that we did not have meetings. At this
point, we were not getting new birds in for cleaning (although they were stockpiled).

The

cleaned up so this was possible, and the forebody was brought to the Bay.
CHAIRMAN HART: Do you feel the jurisdictional roles were
MR. SIMONS:

I have been involved in one major spill (100,000-gallon spill in the Oakland

estuary in 1973). In comparison, the coordination was equal or much better among agencies.

It is

still a situation where there is a limimted number of people who know what to do and they are
physically overtaxed at this time.

We had Coast Guard people who worked 36 hours straight.

stresses our resources.

Session II, Part B
Hearing Participants:
Captain Vince Agapedo -Santa Barbara County Fire
Marie DeSantis - Author and Writer for the National Fisherman
Michael Herz - Tiburon Institute of Environmental Studies
C. W. "Bud" Waage -Clean Seas
Tim Rochte - California Conservation Corps
- Councilman from Redondo Beach, SCAG
Although all the questions are open for discussion, we were hoping there
a

on questions such as: What are the technologies for dealing with such

accidents? Who has it? How available is it? How are people trained to deal with oil spills and fires?
CAPTAIN VINCE AGAPEDO:

Fires may develop that are beyond the capabilities of built-in

systems, and beyond the scope of firefighting government agencies.

As stated earlier, the

capabilities of government agencies in fighting fires is almost nonexistent.

The County Fire

Department does not have the equipment or the jurisdiction, and the Coast Guard or Office of
Emergency Services does not have offshore firefighting capabilities. These services are provided by
private enterprises called Hell Fighters (those professionals specializing in elimina!
and gas well blowouts, well fires, marine tanker fires, platform fires).

fires from oi

A few of these companies

include Red Adair, Boots and Coots, and Schmidt International. By way of example, I will

the

operations of Boots and Coots, Inc., based in Houston, Texas.
If there were an offshore incident within Santa Barbara County, a jurisdictional agency would

be responsible for setting up and maintaining a command system, logistical support, communications
information. Boots and Coots provides specialized equipment and expertise in working in
-23-

have worked 22 incidents
cache in Los Angeles comprised of a
concentrate; associated application nozzles and
caches are in

Francisco and Texas.

Upon requestt men

equipment and provide a barge or
can be loaded and secured.

For an incident in

to store an equipment ship. At the same time,
architect from Virginia would be flown in.

Once everyone is

an attack would be made on the fire. The total response time is

to

would require additional pumps from Texas. This would

action

These are minimum estimates.
Fighters can be judged as some of the best firefighters in the world.
expertise, ability to work within a strict command organization,
However, I am uncomfortable about relying on this system as it
the limitations which are a result of the dependency upon the
involved with equipment caches.
local public decision makers must make some hard decisions upon
whether they are acceptable.

Santa Barbara County Fire Department

questions and provide some of the solutions through proper
process.
technology capable to clean up an offshore oil spill
the near future.

I

Before documenting this

common sense. A calm ocean is as smooth and workable as a
can skim oil from a calm ocean. The difference between a
it never stays that way for very long, particularly on the waters
ocean is experiencing even moderate winds and seas, it is

to

oil is churned up into the water. It should be obvious to everyone
the salad dressing until someone stops shaking the bottle.
control over

not

one who shakes the seas.

more difficult to visualize, even in the most ordered seas, the waves
across the sea; rather, the waves exist in herringbone patterns so

even if

is sitting on the crest of a wave, a long outrigger such as used on the
ships, is likely to sit on the trough or another part of the wave, and

this

thrashing, and splashing of the boom through the water which is
but skimming. This, remember, is an ordered sea.

A sea condition is

on waves, which superimpose on swells. So far no one has thought
such a surface.
The vessel, Mr. Clean, built in 1978, 130 feet in length, is
ar

to both the Coast Guard and the oil
-24-

a

is the state-of-the-art vessel for
barrels of oil were

;_;.:;..;;___.;.---O.=..;.

recovered a total

take Mr. State-of-the-Art

the

flat

next day, November 8, Mr. Clean reported he was
These weather conditions were 15- to

to recover

winds and seas that were 5 to 7 feet.

These sea

conditions are medium to
to

the boom. From
to recover oil

anchorages. In other words,
on the open sea conditions that were greater
state-of-the-art vessel.

2

it is

information I have given comes from on-scene report made

the Coast

Guard on the Puerto Rican spill.
I think everyone in this

of the

is

if a

and inventiveness of our
dollars to

million

walk on

can walk on

that is the source of our

can walk on

can then believe that

we

inventiveness. Thank you.
spent the last year at the

DR.

to
came out of our
because there is

taken care of

on here which has

that I

and say,

we have made

that should

and

but

as

the case.

We are a

area that hasn't even

office

the

and

seems that many of

the more

recommendations

'thi~

been look

at offshore oil

here since before the turn of the
the events of the
see

th

to what

occurrence of

said

a number

;_;;;.:.;::;.::.:::..:;:....:_:.:.;:;,;::~

_..;;..;;_;;..o;_,_.;.;~"-'

even is one

into his
and
and the

Bay, outward
a large, massive

the focus of the Coast Guard and
lost. A

the

the first few hours

and
vessels
who was

A

the scene
ready to

off the

when

water and
rescue underway and lives saved. Then the
the sea conditions were quite moderate,
was a pre-World War II tugboat converted to a
time in its history to fight the fire. It
had to retire. The Navy sent two 108-foot
a failure of its mast that raises nozzles up into
so they were out of commission.

During this

Marin Headlands; and fortunately, a vessel of
to get a towline on the stern and tow it offshore.
while the vessel was under tow, it was leaking oil,
Guard set up a prohibited area within which they did not want
F ara11on Islands and Pt. Reyes Marine Sanctuary, and west

coast.

unclear, these towing boundaries were violated for 12 hours
broke in two, and the stern sank within the sanctuary.

case,

to 35,000 barrels of oil. The oil, during the first three days, did as
and moved south, but then there was this mysterious
the oil reversed direction and moved 24 miles north, wrapped
is the centerpiece of the Marine Sanctuary, set aside
referred to, was, first of all, a Southern
explosion and took 24 hours to get to San Francisco.

a

was described as a freak wave. The harbor master says it was out
operators were unfamiliar with the area.

She was out

or four days and not available to do skirnming.
days after the oil turned north, there was some cleanup attempted; but as
percentage of the oil spill was cleaned up.

Some of

Harbor. Five thousand birds were oiled

k

in terms of a worst case scenario, it does not approach the

a worst case,

yet we had a lot of problems.

explosion is believed to be that surface plating over a tank was
soda leaked around the tank. Static electricity sparked the explosion

a

as if it were a hinged trapdoor. Recommendations for the future are:
firefighting capabilities. Multipurpose vessels such as developed
oil fields, a vessel that is 150 to 200 feet long which is capable
cleanup capability, and tankage capacity, must be quickly on the
scene.

we

up

was that the barges we used for holding the skimmed-up oil
-26-

are not preferred offshore. When Mr. Clean filled up, it did not have any place to pump its oil and
had to go all the way back to San Francisco to

800

was

it

oil and

also difficulty in lack of compatibility of hoses between vessels that were cleaning up
barges holding the oil. The equipment must be on the scene
We found, as the

was

it must be

around,

after the

existed no

designating areas in which you might tow a disabled vessel if it lost power or is on fire.

must

be less sensitive areas.
There is not a good understanding of the current

move oil up and down

What carried the oil 24 miles north in the Puerto Rican incident was a phenomenon that happens
annually.

We have two coastal current regimes; a California current that moves south during

spring and summer, and the Davidson current that moves

the fall and winter.

changeover phenomenon was in the process of occurring, and it should have

to

because of the wind shift 12 hours before the current shift. It could have been possible to
booms out at the Farallons to prevent damage to that

This
some

habitat.

Our recommendation for the oceanographic community is that we need to have research
programs to better understand these offshore currents that move the oil in and out and up and down
our coast so that we can make accurate predictions.

Ideally~

we should

some

record wind and barometric pressure and current directions so we know what is going on.
We feel that it is the responsibility of the industry to pay for the research and
because the industry is making money moving the oil back and forth. Ultimately, the consumers will
have to pay part of that
coastline is a cost of

but it seems that the

to

these resources and the

business.

of resources has been done here to a better extent than in Northern California.
However, it is one thing just to map the resources, but the second step is to set up a mitigation
response program. If you have identified a delicate habitat or area of
is

to

you want to note that it is vulnerable

significance, or area

have the equipment and people trained

coming ashore in that area.
In response to coordination and communication, we are concerned about the situation when the

Coast Guard set boundaries to not have the vessel towed in, but they were violated.

There is a

with having an unseen coordinator, and explicit orders should be written
backup person

and a

to be present to enforce these

Again, I was surprised to see how vulnerable you are with extensive production already

on.

(For a more complete discussion of the Puerto Rican episode, see Exhibit "E".)
COUNCILMAN AHCHIE SNOW: I am also a member of the
Los

County, and we feel that this oil production

Every community in California is supposed to have an
many coastal commmunities

a plan, but

Planning Commit t F)e for
will be a major

I don't know
the Office of Emergency Services should

mandate that all communities, whether on the ocean or waterways, have some sort of
event that there is a

for us.

of oil or toxic substances in their waters.
-27-

in

of Governments) is responsible for the
transportation plan, and acts as a clearinghouse for
and transportation background, SCAG is vitally concerned
risk management as being discussed at this
the crude by pipeline from Santa
there are significant factors involved
not be ignored.
pipeline requires blending the oil with natural gas liquid or heating
easier through the pipeline. This pipeline is going through the permitting

at

process presents a potentially serious public hazard.
or explosions should be planned for early in the design
pipeline will be 130 miles long, pass through 12 cities and 18
areas.

This pipeline must be structurally sound and consideration must be

areas.
present risks. The best way to deal with this is a thoroughly tough env
way will the possible risks associated with a ruptured pipeline

kept to

need an adequate study of define all the risks associated with
experience with OCS and EIS/EIRs have not been good.
accurately provide the full information and effects.
in

SCAG does not
A big problem is

documents, such as "best available technology". Who defines
State shoutd be

lead agency in regards to worldwide

pipelines.
also need more time to prepare for this development
we want it or not. (For complete test, see Exhibit "L".)
EIRs too technical?
we cannot understand their technical jargon. We do not
to decipher these reports.
(Please see Exhibit "F" for the statement from Clean
I am the area manager of the California Conservation Corps for the
to Pt. Conception.
Code enforces the CCC and employs 2,200 young
public conservation works.

We also assist public agencies in emergency

supplies a disciplined and energetic source of workers to the benefit of
As such, we are a support rather than a lead agency.
capability, we have usually been involved with fires, floods
have also had direct experience with oil spills, and I have led two
four years.
occurs, the

is dispatched through the local county emergency services
a public agency. The CCC can immediately
to
-28-

closest to

call.

the

most coastal areas of California within one to four

can

this area (Santa Barbara) and would be the

uniforms and basic

depends on the size of the incident.
tools.
years, the CCC has

In the

We were involved

Luis Obispo Creek in San Luis Obispo County involving

creek cleanup operations, our crew was

cleanup of water from the Puerto Rican incident.
shore.

responsible for removing oil from the creek bed

six weeks to clean it up. The August, 1985 oil spill involved 30 staff workers in a three-week
and

for collecting,
In the Puerto Rican incident, the CCC was
water fowl. One 15-person crew worked for two weeks on that
Our goal is to respond to emergencies quickly

deal with bureaucratic matters later

billing sources after commencement). As far as training goes, it has been
San Pedro, a few years ago.

y

Oil in

We also receive specialized training by onsite experts.

Our Corps

members and staff are well-trained in disaster relief of all sorts, and they are capable of any cleanup operation.
Session III
What are the best measures to prevent such

be

What

What training is needed and what inspection procedures should be followed? In
actions should be taken to reduce and to

discussion, what

the risks of oil- and

gas-related accidents?

Commission
on Marine Safety
- U.S. Merchant Marine Academy,
Research
Gordon Cota -

Barbara

Jerry

Marine

Dr. Floyd Tuler - Worcester

Dr.
Clair

Armand - UCSB Marine

Institute

- Chevron

Robert Sollen - Sierra Club
Martha Blum -

League of Women

MS. SUSAN HANSCH: The California Coastal Commission is
in offshore gas and oil operations.

has jurisdiction over the

in

with the

of

Federal waters.

Before any exploratory or developmental

must find that the project is consistent with the resource protection policy
Act does define the offshore energy development as coastal dependent and
operations as priority uses.

The Act does require the Commission to

are mitigated to the maximum extent feasible and
location.

The Commission has vigorously addressed the

spills and accidents by requiring specific mitigation measures for
equipment~

training facilities for the California Maritime Academy and the

done by all State, local and Federal agencies, but there is
equipment is critical. This equipment must be continuously
that uses this equipment must be fully trained and tested for
tanker and offshore facilities must be regular to correct equipment problems
CCC calls unannounced oil spill drills. These are a critical hands-on test

personnel. All existing techniques is not enough -- oil spill equipment is only
seas.

When resources are especially valuable, it is sometimes better for the public
One of the biggest challenges facing Federal, State and local governments

oil and gas production and transportation is cumulative impact; that is,
of offshore drilling and tankering. There is a strong need for overall

to

impacts and establish acceptable thresholds and risks.
focus of today's hearing is offshore risks, I think it is important to stress
as well.

Any legislation or overall planning for offshore fac

account the associated onshore facilities.
ROGALIN:

In reference to earlier testimony about the dangers or lack

transport of molten sulfur, I would like to mention the incident in the San
area.

was an accident with a truck carrying molten sulfur from a refinery in Benicia, and

were
to the National Academy of Sciences in the period of 1969 to 1979, there were, in
collisions with platforms; 11 of these produced structural damage, 3 were
are used in risk management depends on where you stand. In a recent
of a vessel in port were given at the highest as once in 80
a newspaper could list three explosions in U.S. ports within a few years.
measures to prevent such accidents involve good training, inspection and
fire departments must board tankers and check inert gas systems.

Inert

properly and that requires specialized training, which is not expensive or long to
provide for inspections by local fire departments before unloading begins.
inspections and emergency evacuations should be practiced on offshore facilities.
accidents should also be analyzed. This equipment is needed:
F

a minimum of 6,000 to 12,000 gallons per minute systems to deliver water to the
-30-

Santa

of

deck of burning platforms or tankers. They should be under

y

Fire Department.
of

There should be
There must be adequate
discharge

90
include 200-mile

Necessary legislative action

and waterways standards, and providing the Coast Guard with
at all ports.

The State should require fireboats and rescue

involved in

Comprehensive disaster plans should be mandated for all
operations.
CHAIRMAN

Have these recommendations

advocated in

MS. ROGAUN: Many of the equipment recommendations

been

MR. MAURICE SCHERB: I have been a consultant on marine
to make these points. Management must

responsible

for many years,

safety. Reliable data banks can provide

early warning systems which allow you to catch a problem before it develops into a disaster. Black
box recorders help trace down complications. They should
imnprove initial designs, rather

onshore as well as on ships. \Ve

completed

MR. CARMEN PIZZARIELLO: CAOHF (Computer Aided
United States Merchant Marine Academy has been in

since 1976. We have

handling simulation that can simulate any vessel in any

area.

By model

such as the movement of ships, and simulating the perspective of a captain on a
and

at the

Hesearch

problems,

we can record

data with the most sophisticated simulation to reduce risks involved in
This can develop more reliable and
levels of
MR.

our

can be quantified.

contributes to
for a statement on the

My fishing involves transit near the shipping

say that American
mariners.

vessels

vessels

problem. I would like to

crew

and

is

that in transit through the Channel, someone on the

In the past, I did not encroach on
Where are the

to

we deal with have professional, sophisticated, and well-trained

unfortunately; ships come through with no

does not do any good if human

and I would

of

best

il

are made.
What is the minimum level we will
best measure for preventing such accidents is to have a

MH.
comprised of

and

operators,

others within the area that require some input to
can work together to

guidelines, terminal

caring for the environment. The Port of Valdez is a
We have the

to meet the needs of safe and
-31-

This group of
and a general source of
of such an organization.
marine

one

any system is the human element. The best we

and hope that they can react wisely in time of emergency or normal
competent workers.
compromised. Officers and terminal operators must be trained to
have firefighting schools and in-house
and improvements made.
are sufficient.

spill

Terminal regulations and oil

y to successful operation is solid cooperation.
ARMAND:

Thank you, Senator Hart. If the mike works, I

very briefly the subject of research in the area of safety
operations.
industry began off the coast of California nearly one hundred years ago
over water was drilled from a wharf in Summerland in 1887) before going through
are witnessing today.

California has watched all this activity, but with a

to take a very active part in the associated technology, which is

most

The engineering challenges to be met in order to insure safety
as oil and gas exploration and exploitation lie at the frontiers of
fields of investigation.
is to be compared with the situation of Norway. Ever since
in the North Sea, Norway has made it mandatory for the
contribute to a research fund for improving safety and
level is used for research which is, for the most part, conducted
a county with less than 5 million inhabitants, has during the
undisputed world leader in the advanced aspects of offshore technology.

The

Classification Society, Det Norske Veritas, for the design, construction,
of offshore structures, originally developed for the harsh North
are now enforced worldwide. Norway is also consulted whenever a disaster takes
and asked to draw the lessons which would, hopefully, prevent
mishaps. All this started only 15 years ago.
nature of offshore operations varies greatly from one geographical area to
the subject of specific studies.

The University of California with

at Berkeley, San Diego (Scripps), and Santa Barbara, possesses an
Engineering, which in the nation today, only MIT and Woods Hole can possibly
It is to be hoped that research in the area of safety and reliability of offshore oil and
now only timidly supported, will be strongly encouraged in the near future by Federal
as well as by oil companies. It is after all in the best interest of this country to
an appropriate technological know-how. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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CHAIRMAN HART:

Thank you, Professor.

mechanism in Norway and how that

Can you tell me a little more about the tax

Testimony was that Norway

a

is development that takes place; the oil companies are basically

that when there

in some

money goes for research •••
DR. ARMAND: ••. That is

some of the tax.

They are

right to driU and to operate in the Norwegian waters.

taxed in

have

But the point is that some of this tax is

directed to extensive research, which has put Norway in the forefront of research and know-how in
offshore engineering.
CHAIRMAN HART: And we have no such requirement or taxing authority here in this country?
supported by, but I

DR. ARMAND: Well, right now research is

NOAH, USCG, and oil companies, which all do their own "'''"''"'<"'"'h

say, very

to

There is no combined

make all of these results available. Oil companies know their stuff very well,

they do

own

research, and they usually do not make the results available to the public nor to other research
agencies.
CHAIRMAN HART:

What area of research do you feel is most promising or most in need of

attention as it relates to our own oil development procedure here in Southern California?

Is

anything that stands out that you think is particularly pressing in terms of research that you
needs to be done at this point in time?
DR. ARMAND:

Well, the point I am trying to make is that

evolved in the past few years, and we now have no
problems which are new.

has

solutions, but we have ways of approaching

Some of them came from the nuclear industry, and a

aeronautics (it was mentioned a few minutes ago that a tremendous effort for safety
taking

of them from
reliability

in aeronautical engineering, which is correct).

SENATOR MARKS: How big is the tax? What percent is it

DR. ARMAND:

is it high?

I do not have the exact figures, but I can assure you

conducted by Det

Veritas and by the University of Torendine in

the
area of

reliability alone is in the area of $50 million a year.
SENATOR MARKS: I would think, and nobody likes to pay taxes, but I would think that if the
oil companies were assured that this would be helpful to them, as well as helpful to their co
that they might not object to some form of tax, if it were not too

Now,

sometime talk about it. It would seem to me that if the oil companies are
own research, it might be an advantage to them to join together and

now for

to conduct research. I

really appreciate it if somebody would comment on that.
MR. DUNAWAY: Independent research going on at the same time by many different
produce a large amount of difference in approaches and ideas to problems that would be lost under
one research organization.

Many inputs means more ideas.

Whenever an agency

a new

technology it can be opened up to other companies to make sure all have this new technology.
SENATOR MARKS:

I would seem to me that. if companies were to support in some way (I am

not suggesting a heavy tax), organizations such as the Coast Guard that are helpful to
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that it

Professor Marshall Tulin had hoped to give this presentation
record, and I am happy to read it for him. He is a
Exhibit 'tt-l" for Professor Tulin's letter.)
I want to thank again all our panelists for being with us today,
are some additional questions that are
now to come forward.

They are:

Dr. Floyd Tuler

Mr. Robert Solten of the Los Padres Chapter of the Sierra
Barbara League of Women Voters.
Thank you, Senator Hart and members of the Subcommittee. My
a professor in the Mechanical Engineering Department at
Worcester, Massachusetts. I am pleased this day to get the ,_,..,"'"'"
you, and in passing, I would like to mention that I am
to this area where I used to live for a number of years.
to make some comments concerning the use of risk analysis
management, both in the United States and abroad. These comments come
conducted at MIT about four years ago, and supported by the MMS

a

Laboratories. The findings and opinions are solely mine and
in this area have continued, and I am currently conducting a
of lvtexico. Our studies of the potential and the limitations
environmental management suggests certain policy
private operators, and other parties
regulatory agencies to help set priorities for
requirements, and for establishing new regulations to
For example, as discussed earlier, the overall
coast might be improved by studies of the potential conflicts between
ing lanes in the region.

These methods can also be used for

they are achieving their goals. There have been
ships for North Sea platforms. Previously,
as oil companies, drilling contractors, equipment designers,
their use of probablistic methods in their studies of new systems
could help and make their operations safer and less costly in
workers, and the environment. Furthermore, in addition to just publishing
the assumptions and methods of such studies would provide for criticism and
public concerns about offshore hazards.
interest organizations and local government should also be alert to the
use of these formal methods of analysis may present to them. If properly
-34-

used, such methods offer the hope of better control of low probability, high consequence event
the sort that so often motivate opposition to offshore and other
such groups to learn how risk analysis works

how it is

projects. It is
so they may become

of
for

participants and critics of its use.
We should realize that risk analysis is not a panacea for the management of any
offshore oil development or safety control, and it should be considered for use with

awareness of

its strengths and its limimtations.
There appears to be little basis for imposing on and requiring operators and other
they carry out formal risk analysis of all projects on a routine basis. Instead, at the current state-ofthe-art technique, and of its practice in the United States, risk analysis is a tool that should be
reserved for use in exceptional circumstances.

For most applications, the use of risk anal

has

tended to focus the attention of analysts and decision makers on low probability, high consequence
events. Because risk analysis is oriented towards catastrophic events, it is unreasonable to expect
that it can substitute for the more traditional types of safety and environmental studies that tend to
focus on more likely events that could happen everyday.

But these traditional methods are

inadequate for addressing these most catastrophic losses, thus the two approaches can best be viewed
as being complimentary.
It should be noted that risk analysis is not just another technique of analysis like others used by
good engineers.

Because it is based on analysis of probabilities, it involves an entirely different

mind-set from the deterministic methods that are traditionally used.

Prerequisites to

effective use of risk analysis is the willingness to accept the fact that nearly anything can happen at
some level of probability, but that not all such events are equally probable or equally damaging.
Finally, you may wish to consider more far-reaching changes in the regulatory system that
would take advantage of the power of formal risk analysis. Used properly, risk analysis can allow for
more effective regulation of safety and environmental risks, while allowing industry
ility in the selection of available technology and operation methods, and while assigning more of

the responsibility for the effective control of hazards to the operating company.
This might be done for example by adapting the self-regulation approach known in Norway as
internal control, or by requiring that operators adopt a formal program of quality assurance.
the system of internal control, operators must fulfill a set of overall procedural require:nents for
safety management that substitute for the estimate and oversight of detailed design and operat
rules by regulatory authorities.

As compared with more traditional approaches towards regulation,

this system involves substantially less day-to-day oversight of company operations

regulator

authorities, while it strengthens the accountability of operators for the consequences of
activities through full public disclosure.
Clearly, as we have heard today, the rapid increase in offshore activity in Santa Barbara
overtax the regulatory and emergency response agencies. Fewer regulations require fewer regulatory
staff that are needed if every installation is supervised by government representatives. Nevertheless,
all offshore designs and operations should be made subject to random spot checks by authorities.
-35-

a key role

determining whether a proposed design is

levels of acceptable risk set forth by the regulating agency.
internal control requires that a level of acceptable risk be specified so
have taken the steps necessary to design an acceptable system
a

an

of acceptable risk has proven to be
United States for regulating nuclear power.

can be estimated for offshore activities in the California
use of risk analysis as a tool for identifying and mitigating hazards
both opportunities and potential problems for all the parties
However, increased use of these techniques can, I believe,
Thank you.
GHYLIN: Thank you, Senator Hart and members of the Committee,
today.

With your permission, I would like to submit a 20-page

and just briefly make a couple of comments.
I am the General Manager of Land for Chevron in the San
area,

in California and have participated in offshore matters for more than the
the general tone of the hearing of the conciliatory and cooperative

is

an indication that we will continue to try to resolve the problems of offshore
mutual meetings such as this, and I commend the Committee for
spoke about marine terminal laws and regulations, and I would like to
production of platforms and things related to that, although I think I
that he reached: that we have enough laws and regulations, and we
toward further cooperation between the governmental agencies,

industry,

to voluntarily, and through cooperative programs, install
as far as safety or pollution control.
I

many of our difficulties have occurred because of the number

jurisdiction problems that have been created by overlapping Federal,

and

statement that will be filed with you, for instance, I list the 34 Federal laws that
our operations in the Federal waters.

Many of these were addressing individual

individual Federal agencies; and many of them were passed
impact or effect on other Federal laws, or State or local laws.

We would

to use the existing process, and the existing regulatory agencies, if possible, to add or
any of the risk analysis of safety programs you are considering.
was

by an earlier speaker was the flexibility of existing

have changing environments and changing technology. For example, the
Barbara, in its regulatory regime, has imposed on my company at the Pt. Arguello
says "if at any time the County determines that these permit conditions are
effectively, significant, environmental impacts caused by the project, or that
-36-

recent proven
is an
have the
the kinds of advance
conditions.
process for

is understandable when you
project, which was

for our Pt.
the
the first half of 1978, at

1977 and

Those studies went

time a series

EIS was adoptedt

and conditions were imposed on the leases to

many of the risks

that were talked about here today.
Following the sale in

for the purpose

of immediately

Coastal Commission and to D.O.I.

wells.
the middle

Those environmenta

the middle of 1979

in

and

time the State

1980,

to

It was lB months of studies

of those

of

resulted in the
as part

our

That was in
of

Santa Barbara as
that we
and resolution
at any of the times

are

the example

y can

Ms. Guzman
between the

and
of how the

is an

manner. We

at that before we
irne ago

that was

by the oil

why, but I would

interested in your comments.
who

on oil

license almost

else

in California -- we

are of

danger to their own

not be some
who are

e'lvironrnent.
y

on these
-3 -

is

defer to tv1r. Dunaway, but let me say that I think
that we are all equally concerned primarily

objective of the

I think

problem we see is another

training programs for all personnel.

There are

carry a certification card.
The State also has training programs, more stringent than those
and a daily drill is required.
the use

drugs on platforms? Are inspectors looking

but the MMS feels that oil companies are primarily responsible for
Are there Federal regulations about whether drugs or

are

if they are illegal, obviously -- but about whether alcohol is

on

We do not have a specific requirement, ....
company does, and I believe all the other companies operating in the
prohibitions against drugs and alcohol while on the platforms.

The

some prescription drugs, and those are very limited and monitored. Usually the
to
Thank you, Senator Hart.

Let me say, first of all, that I am

Chapter of the Sierra Club, which is the local chapter, and that
approved in principle by the local chapter, but there was not
and

to run it

bureaucracy of the Club, so this does not necessarily

policy. (See Exhibit "K" for the Sierra Club statement.)
you, Mr. Sollen. Let me just ask you one question. Based on
statements that we already have enough regulations, they would have some
concerns

some of your proposals.

I would like to ask you if you would view these

as ones that would be added to the existing framework or regulations, or do you see
way being

to substitute for some of the existing regulations? That
is already so much overlap and so many different requirements
as

as to

with some of the issues that

have

we
to our

I am interested in streamlining. I do not know of any additional requirements
in place.

The conditions put in place by the County, for instance, are very

are volumes of conditions numbering into the hundreds.

My point is that putting

not mean they are going to be enforced, and I do not propose new agencies or
What I propose is a joint powers agreement among existing agencies,
of any new ones.
me again

to summarize what you are saying: That
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problem is

not so

the existing

often Lhe enforcement
of interest.

the SLr that may

to enforce t

aut

MR.
:nenl today.

It cannot

three more

You

this three-mile

which does not have to

with the most authoriit y is the C::oast

the f).Q.I. has

Commission leaves

territorial line, but other

up.

MRS. MARTHA

UM:

the

am

a

We thank you for

Barbara.

making that makes our

The

open

accountable.

nnvA·rnr-n

has

situation in the

Channel.

In prepar,qt ion for the

vast increase in oil
updates,
allow

and
little time for sound
County

basis, but in looking at

cases, the overall

effect of oil and gas
ies

to do

is necessary.
these

uncertainty and fear of what

in
and Federal

lost.

A look at the

our County

some

into

has observed

the environ

we

in

balances

and authorit
of our

and our

recommendations:

L

Coordination of

for accidents

Guard

au!horit
for
We

the

vol.t~rs

to

3.

We

air

the increase
to help this process.
the

but we

The State has
also

r

Thank you.

Any questions?

All right, thank

now who we have asked to speak, and we can just have

come

will be Horace Pennington.
afternoon. My name is Horace Pennington
are a new company in Ventura, and we are here in
California. We have developed a new safety product that we would
pamphlets that we have introduced to this panel, and also to the MMS

of the drill stem during offshore drilling, hydraulically. At
is manually, and we are trying to show that we are in support of
to prevent catastrophic situations.

I will have a pamphlet in the

I would like to ask just one question. Has this product been adopted by

At this time, no, sir, it has not. We are in the process •••
MARKS: Has it been presented to them?
Yes, sir. It was presented to them originally in 1981 when our original
only manufacturer in the world that manufactured such an item. It was not
there are two competitors who do manufacture this item. We feel
safety features of it ••.•
All right, very good. Thank you. George Silva?
of the Subcommittee, I am George Silva. I have had over ten
planning at the local government level.
to emergency management systems.

I am currently

Because of the lateness of the

very brief.
to sell you anything other than, perhaps, a concept. What I would like
to

address what I believe to be the fundamental issue of this particular hearing. It
have

of all types of risks, mostly engineering risks, some
there are three types of risks that we as human beings

we recognize them or not, that in fact exist; known risks, those things that
we are convinced they are risks; and finally, perceived risks, whether actuai or
to

it was disclosed that a great deal of effort, as well as a great deal of money, has
to provide answers to many apparent risks posed by oil and gas development and
offshore and onshore.

I would like to address my comments in the broader sense,

County. We are concerned from a risk standpoint of onshore, as well as
of oil and gas development. As someone put it this morning, we are learning answers
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more answers in

learn a

and I believe that to be true, and we will

to risk

he

future.

to

for more of

However, even though we are

understood the

I am not convinced that we have

that

answers

risks that we deal with in this area? And, what is the importance of each of
have heard discussed vessel collision risks;

lure

with vessel, vessel with

risks, explosion, fire, operator failure, and numerous other risks.

agree.

are

off the

by the future oil and gas

liowever, are they the total picl ure of risks

e of

coast and the processing facilities on the coast in the
l Jnt l vvG have an all

!hi
thercforr~

1cern.

development, we will not be assured that we are

to recommend

recommend lo this SubcommiU ee that you give

ure
some of

that part of the revenues that will be realized relative to oil and gas

risk anal

the Federal impound funds could be permitted to a

of

energy development as it relates to the State of California.

What are the benefits that
referring to an engineering study or a
believe the

(I am not

derived from such a
y study, but rather a

of such a study would be

industry, with a comprehensive understanding

not only the communi
what we will be

with

the

making it possible for a more effective commitment of all of our resources,
concern.

address those risks that are of
used

y, mi

word today

generally

on

Of course, we deal wi

From a commercial

and we have
ion

course, mit

undesirable consequencen, and that

risks
wants to

y

and

the facility at its maximu11 with minimum
most

From
equally conducted

in

with the possib

would like

that

that certain occurrences

not occur in the future.
I have addressed them in

We have identified all of the reasonable

advance. I might call to your
world i oday, that the
meth

::~tt

oper::~tors

arfl much better

as a result of Bhopal.

throughout lhe world

that in most

ention that I

lo deal wi

and have identified

may be.

undesirable consequences, use an appropriate matrix
mitigate the

catastrophe occur, that both industry and the community is

The

y

alL of the

in
determine all

concern, and then prioritize them so that the community, and t
not

ion

I am not sure that most major

route to doing that is to do a comprehensive risk

issues appropriately.

chemical

can then

those

ility of their occurrence, but should a
deal with
revenues be committed b the State

Therefore, I recommend that some of the
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which would then be of use to all

a

certainly to the industry. Thank you.
Thank you very much. Michael McDermott.
OTT: Good afternoon, Senator Hart and members of
Barbara~

and I am a 1979 graduate of the California State

an unlimited

Mate's license in the United States

to offer some points of insight based on my years of experience as a watch
cargo officer on West Coast tankers.
prepared statements; instead, I have tried to respond to some of the
so I

will bear with me if I am a little

Earlier on, there was a point made of requiring on-board
As one of my old navigation instructors often informed us,
aid on

most

bridge of a ship is the Mark One eyeball. It is just

behind those eyballs that are becoming the subject of greater fatigue, stresses,
to a a number of factors; many of them tied to the economic plight of the
is the watch standing structure.

Current Coast Guard and

(IMO) regulations call for three watches for three mates -- 4 on and 8 hours
in the Merchant Marine, this procedure is being changed as
comes into port, it has to do a lot more work. I should explain the

is
a

officer, a second officer, and two 3rd officers stand the nav

hardships that have come on, they have eliminated the second 3rd
mate in the watch rotation.
good if he stands his watch. Unfortunately, when you come on
increased workload. This has led, while still on the roster as maintaining a
to the

and third officer relieving each other, standing 6 on and 6

you are stressing the people far beyond their limits, and this is going on, depending on
for several weeks without end.
problem that is faced is decision making at sea. In the oil business paychecks
have someone making a decision who has their paycheck show up from
concerns are going to become a little clouded; and if
where do their loyalties lie? If they vote for safety, who is going to take care
payments?
may come into play in issues such as loading and discharge regulations.

Also when

- we have been talking about disabled vessels off the coast.
numerous
where

There are

history where masters have actually procrastinated to the point
ships go around in order to not let their vessels be taken as salvage, and hopefully,
on a contract to show up. There is a very big difference. If a tug contracts to
a set

If someone comes and salvages your vessel, they basically own
-42-

vessel.

There is a great economic disincentive to let someone have salvage

desperate the situation. Once again, the people mak
1hroughout

this industry have two bosses:

saff~t

these decisions at re

of
on

y and work considerations, And they have lhe fa,;t

they have to keep their job.
Earlier there was some talk about radios, who participates, who
found

and so forth.

hat on the West Coast about two-thirds of the time you call somebody you can

!o an

answer. If you know who you are calling, if you can identify them, you can get a response.

Ot

areas of the country, it is much worse. One concern I have currently is in the Gulf Coast. The radio
channels are currently a nightmare.

On the prime navigation and emergency channels, Channel 16

and so forth, you have basically, well, I won't describe who they are, but you have people
country and western 1nusic,

jokes, and just about carrying on their radio DJ prm;,ra:ns on he

navigation frequency. This has not gotten that bad on the West Coast, but the influx of crew
supply boats, and so forth, coming frorn the Gulf, may very well change that situation.
Once again, back to the subject of radios and collision avoidance in general, the rules of the
road, radio traffic are designed for intership - ship to ship. When you run into a situation when you
have four to five different ships, perhaps it is nighttime so you are not able to identify which

you

are calling, you start to play a game running between the radar and the radio set I o see who

am

talking to, give him a bearing back and forth, it can become a very confusi'lg situation very

y,

nnd that can add to a lot more stress.
Point 2 gets into traffic.

There has been a lot of talk about the traffic lanes off the coast.

There has been very little talk about the traffic separation, or the precautionary zone at Pt.
Concept ion and Pt. Arguello. The traffic lanes basically end at Pt. Conception, and there you

t

from

y

very rational, ordered, divided traffic flow into a helter skelter transit area where

its. You have traffic coming from the north, from lhe Far-East, fro•n Alaska, and you have traffic
leaving the Los Angeles Basin and corning out of the traffic lanes. Everybody is !)Ding his own way
and there is no control, no guidance in this area. This is just the area that a lot 1nore

are

put in right now.
That gets into another area of rules of the road, traffic separation schemes, and

y

conflict with the laws of physics from time to time. We heard people talking of smaller vessels
bigger vessels.
II takes a long disUmce to stop a ship, and thai is if you am

prep;m~d

to do t. : Jsunl !y ! he:

vessels opera! ing the Channel are operating at sea speed, which means that their engineering
Bre turned up for maximum efficiency, and they cut in extra burners if L1ey have got boilers, or

y

have <::JOt it down into a routine for high speed long distance running. If you have lo maneuver, you
have lo come out of that and then down into your maneuvering mode and then try to stop your vesneL
Correspondingly, if you are entering port, you are also going to be maneuvering. This is the t irne l hat
the most engineering

c3suallir~s

take place, when you are making changes in your

pl::mt.

Safe! y zones are very nice unless the vessel loses power. I have been on a 70,000-pound tanker that
lost power off of Pt. Reyes.

Vve were seven miles off of Pt. Reyes; the vessel had about 5
-43-

was no

to even move that without going through a long laborious process
we would end up coming to a dead stop on a calm day three
opposite direction. We just made one very long run. So a thousand-yard
a whole lot of good if you have a casualty of any sort.
one so far in the chemical dispersant studies had mentioned

dispersant used in the oil industry today, and I am talking about liquid dishwashing

common
soap.

most

=-::...:...:...;.~....;;_;;_.:;..;:;.;...;._...;....;;..._

comes into mind.

You will very rarely find a tug, workboat, or any

not carry some of this stuff for their handy little spills if something goes wrong.

to report spills, accidents, or anything that may reflect on the license,
holding abilities of the people involved in it. And the oil companies are not very
you have such massive publicity made about incidents. Understandings can
when paychecks tend to pull the strings.
and tank cleaning. Fifty miles offshore everybody opens up their bilge systems
junk over the side.
zone.

Also tank cleaning is being conducted regularly outside

What this has the effect of doing is creating certain locals of offshore sewers,
opens up their bilges there and everybody closes down their pumping there. So the

to

as much out before you get into the exclusion zone; and as soon as you clear the
pump it all over the side and clean it out. I have actually been on ships

to

this, there are certain regulations that you can only pump out so much per such
been on ships that have actually gone out and spun doughnuts in the ocean,
to comply. This is not altogether uncommon.
there is a tremendous need for Santa Barbara

I

to

open water roadsteads anywhere, and certainly the best on
out there. A roadstead is basically an open area of fairly calm water where
so forth, are quite accessible. There is a definite possiblity that once they have their
that the marine terminals will open up this area as a port, and for the good of the
perhaps that is necessary.

However, no one has looked at this, at the benefits of

authority such as Port Hueneme and Port San Luis have both done.

It gives you

Perhaps Mr. Sollen 1s committee could be organized under a port
to gain revenues from the moving of cargo over your docks. It gives you an
reason to butt your nose beyond the limits of the shore, if this is your port.
of tankers is primarily a reflection of the ports into which they can get.
a certain draft. Some of them, particularly in San Francisco Bay, have to lighten
to

inside San Francisco Bay, and then move off to pump off at the refinery. With an
as you have in Santa Barbara, there is a possibility that instead of scaling the
size of the port, the tankers could move up to a much larger scale, which could
in a roadstead.
a lot of expert testimony about how things are supposed to be.
..44-

Well, I have

work8d among the laborers, and I arn here to tell you thai it is quite a bit different.
mostly, become rituals.

drills have a similar

nature.

dri

do not real

ways we would really deal with a particular emergency.

we

about it than the people I have working under me on

They are

that someone has made up for them, and !hey look at

and

down with

is a need for the training of inspectors to increase their ability to independently go out t
rogul8te. I do think there is a tremendous need for inspectors.
Inert gas systems. An inert gas system is great if it's
get breached.

and it

also

it

If you have a collision, even a small boat colliding with a tanker, you hawl
I have never ,net

breacherl your inert gas system, anrl you are back to an explosive
vapor recovery system.

If you do not have such a syst ern, and Pori San Luis

example, you can get vapors running along the water line, and pleasure boats can

te

I would suggest that inspectors, and those in charge of enforcing regulations, be
higher standarrl, and that the oil industry does not supervise itself or pay those who

them.

There is a great need for a Port Authority in this area to give a continuous and
regulatory control.
SD.,.JA TOR MARKS: I am among

things the Chairman of

Committee on

\-1aritime

who are

Industry. It is a pleasure to hear from you. I think we should hear from more

the

maritime indus! ry as to the problems of the maritime inrlust ry, and I mn very qiad 1tHI you
here. LJne of the problems of the maritime industry is that not all the ships are built
CHAIRMAN
wit

the

the :Jnited

Our next and las! public witness is Geoff Chung, Ph.D., who is concerned

interactions with offshore oil and gas development.
GEOFFREY CHUNG:

My name is Geoff

and I am the interim manrHJer

ironrnental 1-lealth and Safety Office. I would like to offer some

er

:1bout

in

Because of the Universi

proximity and unique proximity to

form Hol

expansion of the offshore oil and gas operations along our coastline, we have a campus
and sensitive environ;nents thai could be exposed lo deleterious effecls arising fron1:
1.

A major oil spill arising from a plat form weti blowout, or tanker

transi

operation.
2.

A tanker or platform fire or explosion.

3.

A sudden or accidental release or venting of gases into the
at nuisance levels.
have surmised from today's hearing that coordination and mobilization for a reasonab

timely notification and response to any of these scenarios are quite limited at this time.
like to see assurances, either from legislative action or administrative action and enforcement the!!
we will have guaranteed support and assistance from the private oil sector,
agencies.

There should be a local comprehensive and function<1l
-45-

Federr~l,

loc::d,

plrm that wil

response for the campus to minimize destruction of our
damage and setbacks to a lot of vital academic marine research
any hazardous exposures to our campus populations.
in the process of drafting a contingency plan to address air quality
difficult at this writing to complete the interface portions of our
and private sectors because many of them have not
portions.
to see a more active role in motivating proper coordinated contingency planning.
HART: Thank you very much. I would like to make some concluding remarks if I
like to thank my colleagues, Senator Marks and Senator McCorquodale,

I

us throughout this lengthy hearing today.

Also, I want to mention that if anyone

comments to be sure to leave them with either of our two repositories over here.
Let me just mention a few of the impressions that I have. It strikes me that one of the most
is the issue of jurisdiction.

Repeatedly today, we have heard of concerns

and I think that is an area on which this Subcommittee needs to spend some
There have been a number of suggestions in the area. It is particularly troublesome
as it

to national or international bodies because we obviously have limited or no jurisdiction as

it

In any case, I think any solution has to address to what extent we can become
national or international bodies or regulatory authorities.

I do not think it is an

I do think it is a very challenging one.

also heard concerns about enforcement. As our last witness, as well as other
go about more effectively enforcing? That may be the $64,000 question. I
am not sure

answer is, but I think some better understanding of what is being implemented,
extent are conditions that are being imposed, or the regulations of laws being enforced is
Subcommittee needs to know more about.
A number of people made references to cutbacks in the Coast Guard, a

of our

affiliated with the University made strong pleas for research funds.
are legitimate concerns and of interest to the Subcommittee.
areas that I was interested in that I think are deserving of additional attention are
to sea

particularly in the western end of the Channel and around the

Conception area, and also the issue of fire prevention.
is really inadequate.

It seems to me that the fire prevention

I am not sure what the answer is, but it is something that is of

concern to me.
A

area

I think is deserving of some attention by the Subcomittee is the issue of what

Puerto Rican. Trying to understand that accident that occurred a year ago may
give us some greater insights into what steps we can take here locally in terms of contingency
would strengthen whatever role we are going to be involved in in terms of trying to
to
-46-

These are some of the comments and concerns that I have. This is

the first

his Subcommittee; there will be others, and I think that this forum
forward on soe potential legislation.
Let me again thank particularly Mr. Schuyler and the
the people associated with the Unviersity of California for helping put on this
tanks to all the participants and everyone who came forward, some
distances, and many people with very busy schedules to participate in
was a lhought ful hearing, and I am very pleased that everyone was able to
not any further comments, this meeting will stand adjourned.
--ooOoo--
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In 1970 the tanker Polycommander ran aground on the Spanish
coast and spilled 112,000 barrels. The spill caught
a fire storm, and sent a black mist of oil and
soot over coastal farms.
In 1983 the Castillo De Belver broke up and burned off
South Africa, resulting in-great damage to hundreds of square
s
rich coastal farmland.
In 1984 the Puerto Rican blew up as it left San Francisco
sunken half of it is still leaking oil. Earlier that
the Sealift Pacific almost went aground off Monterey. No
could have reached it in time, but fortunately its anchors
ld.

and

On August 2 of this year the Jan ran into a lighthouse off
Denmark and spilled 1,500 barrels of heavy oil doing considerable damage to resorts and wildlife. ·
All of these accidents have occurred over the years in some part
of the world. What is the likelihood that similar accidents
could occur in this region over the next 25 years?
classes of accidents that will be considered at
are:
f
s and spills resulting from ship with ship collision
s and spills resulting from ship with platform collision
tug, barge collision with ship or fixed platform
fire on board ship in transit
f
on board ship
emergency cargo offloading operations
ship s
ing
emergency towing operations
stranding of ship, barge or tug with resulting cargo loss
and associated pollution
explosion of tanker with resulting fire or sinking
drilling unit blowout
well control problems
stranding of ladened barges
break in pipelines, either offshore or on land
accidents at onshore processing and storage facilities
and from vehicles transporting hazardous oil and gas
byproducts.

hear

TECHNOLOGY
What technology is in place and proposed to prevent accidents
and respond if accidents should occur? What is the best available technology?
What training is needed? Where and how does it occur?
spection and monitoring programs.are ongoing or proAre they adequate?
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EXAMPLES

ACCIDENTAL EVENTS
BLOWOUT

OFFSHORE OIL SPILL HAZARDS

SPill VOLUME (bbl)
1,000 - 10,000
10,000- 100,000
100,000 OR MORE

I
I.J'
'-l

FREQUENCY(YEARS)bf
CONTACTING COASTLINE
ONCE IN 4,100 (unlikely)
ONCE IN 5, 700
ONCE IN 11,000 (rare)

SEPARATOR RUPTURE

120

ONCE IN 48,000 (rare)

PIG RECEIVER ( 10 min.)

140

ONCE IN 83,000 (rare)

I

PLATFORM IRENE
COLLAPSE

2,500

ONCE IN 910,000 (rare)

OIL PIPELINE RUPTURE MIDWAY TO SHORE

8,400

ONCE IN 16,000 (rare)

UP TO 1,250

ONCE IN 45,000 (rare)

INTERPLATFORM PIPELINE
RUPTURE
SPILL FROM MARINE TRAFFIC
PRECAUTIONARY ZONE

**

THREE PERCENT OF ALL
SPILLS ARE EXPECTED
TO REACH LAND

THE F

AND

SPILLS.
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I

TION.
FOR LARGER SPILLS, THE THIRD lEVEL OF RESPONSE INVOLVES THE

U.S. COAST GUARD

IKE

THIS RESPONSE LEVEL CAN BE CALLED UPON IF THE NEED FOR MORE EXTENSIVE RESOURCES EVER
ARISES.

E E

PLE OF

E CARE

EFFORTS IS EXXON S
THE HONDO OPERATI

ERIENCE
IN 1981,

EN

PREVENT

, IN THE

CIDENTS

D THE RES

BARBARA

ED CALIFORNIA'S DAILY 0

E

EN
E OIL PRODUCT!

HAS ONE OF THE HIGHEST PRODUCING RATES OF ANY PLATFORM, YET, A ER PRODUCING OVER 56
MILLION BARRELS OF OIL, WE HAVE SPILLED ABOUT 5 BARRELS eF
AIU' B

~L.

r1 l"ilt'1"tti'P

BY COMPARISON, THE

~

NATURAL SEEPS JUST OFFSHORE, NEAR THE UNIVERSITY,ADISCHARGE MORE THAN THAT
1'/tfii/!L

•t"'IR.

EVERY~

HONDO IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF HOW GOOD PLANNING AND DESIGN, COUPLED WITH

CAREFUL OPERATIONS, CAN RESULT IN SAFE PRODUCTION OF THE OIL AND GAS THAT IS VITAL TO OUR
ECONOMY,
I
\.,n

\0

I

10,174

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ONSHORE SPILLS

SPILL LOCATION

I

0'

c
I

I

SPILL SIZE (BBL)

FREQUENCY (YEARS)

ONSHORE OIL PIPELINES
(lANDFALl TO lOMPOC)

100 OR MORE
1,000 OR MORE
10.000 OR MORE

ONCE IN
ONCE IN
ONCE IN

170 (UNLIKELY)
1,700 (UNLIKELY)
2,200 (UNLIK

LOMPOC FACILITY

100 OR MORE
1,000 OR MORE
50,000 OR MORE

ONCE IN
ONCE IN
ONCE IN

1,800 (UNLIKELY)
2,800 (UNLIKELY)
25.000 {RARE)

100 OR MORE
900 OR MORE
1.800 OR MOR,E

ONCE IN
ONCE IN
ONCE IN

56 (LIKELY)
560 (UNLIKELY)
1,100 (UNLIKELY)

100 OR MORE

ONCE IN

ONSHORE OIL PIPELINES
(LOMPOC TO ORCUTT)

ORCUTT FACILITY

100,000 (RARE)

CP
\
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~G ~3

WAS

IS CH
SHOWS
QUENCY.
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ES OF

E

THE MO

ONCE IN 56 YEARS.

E EI

ED
E

LIKELY SPILL OF 100

ILLS WI

IR

E
E

900

LARGER PIPELINE SPILLS ARE SHOWN TO BE UNLIK

107 YEARS TO 2,200 YEARS.

I

•

E

I

A PIP

INE

RANGING

I

ONCE IN

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPILL LARGER THAN 100 BBL OCCURRING AT THE

PROCESSING FACILITIES RANGE FROM UNLIKELY TO RARE (ONCE IN 1,800 YEARS TO ONCE IN 100,000
YEARS).

I

0'
1-'

I

YG #3A

THE REGULATORY

E

FOR ONSHORE

OF ALL

0

I

IES REQU RE

ER OF MITIGATION MEASURES

OFFSET THE

AS

OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY

ONSHORE FACILITIES.

THESE PLANS SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE

ANS REQUIRED FOR OFFSHORE OPERATIONS BY THE MMS.

IN ADDITION TO MEETING THE FEDERAL AND STATE STANDARDS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND
OF PIPELINES, SANTA BARBARA COUNTY HAS ADDED SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS:

I

0\
N

I

NTIAL

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REQUIRES SPILL PREVENTION, CONTAINMENT AND
COUNTERMEASURE PLANS FOR

0

N

I

(1) A SYSTEM

SAFETY REVIEW OF ALL OIL DEVELOPMENTS TO ENSURE 'THE BEST POSSIBLE DESIGN OF FACILITIES, (2) THE ADDITION OF ONSHORE ISOLATION VALVES AT STRATEGIC LOCATIONS ON PIPELI
ROUTES, (3) CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR

ILLS FROM ONSHORE PIP

INES, (4) DELUGE SYSTEMS

TO CONTROL FIRES AT CERTAIN TYPES OF STORAGE TANKS AND TRUCK LOADING,

(5)

SPECI

IZ

EMPLOYEE TRAINING PROGRAMS AND OTHER PROJECT-SPECIFIC AND SITE-SPECIFIC CONDIT!
ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL ACCIDENT SITUATIONS ORIGINATING FROM ONSHORE PIPELINES
FACILITIES.

\:N
\

-

178

MITIGATION R

UIR

HO

REQUIREMENTS

AGENCY

I

0\

l.V

EPA

SPC,C PLANS

FEDERAL AND STATE

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION STANDARDS

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY

SYSTEM SAFETY REVIEW

I

lSOLATION VALVES
PIPELINE CONTINGENCY PLANS
DELUGE SYSTEMS
TRAINING PROGRAMS

I

THE OTHER MAJOR CONCERN REGARD!
WITH REGARD TO OFFSHORE TRAN
SHIPPING.

THE RISKS ASSOCI

NTIAL ACCIDENTS IS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTATION.
ION RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES, I'LL NOW ADDRESS
WITH OFFSHORE PIPELINES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED. YOU

MAY RECALL THAT THE RISK OF A PIPELINE RUPTURE MIDWAY TO SHORE FROM THE UNION/EXXON
DEVELOPMENT IN

SANTA MARIA BASIN HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED AS RARE, OR ONCE IN 16,000 YEARS.
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-LOADING FACILITY, TANKER ACCIDENT

ERE

I

R EVENTS,

SHI

ILE UNDERWAY,

WHILE LOADING, RANGE FROM RARE (EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED ON A WORLD BASIS,
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ident, representing less
ip broke up.

Estimates

of the total bird mortalities resulti

from

inci

have

been placed as high as 5,000.
Eighteen days after the explosion, the bow section of the
RICAN was towed back into San Francisco Bay without incident and the
cargo safely unloaded.

Although the stern section has been located

in 1,246 feet of water through the use of side-scan sonar, no action
has been taken to
ing.

the leak which has continued since the sink-

It was estimated that the stern contained 8,500 barrels (367,000

gallons) of bunker fuel when it sank, but the results of our investigation strongly suggest that an additional 11,725 barrels (492,000
gallons) of oil cargo may also have gone down with the ship.
In this report we focus on specific responses to the PUERTO
RICAN incident as a test of Northern California's spill response
capability.

We identify a number of problems encountered in

dealing with the explosion, fire, spill and sinking of the vessel.
then care

We

examine these difficulties to determine why they occur

and make a series of recommendations designed to eliminate the
problems, thus improving responses to future pollution

in~ents.

1. Offshore fire fighting capability does not ·exist in the
Bay Area, and only the moderate weather conditions at the time of
the explosion and fire made it possible to use fireboats that normally are restri
to the Bay.
In more severe weather, the
fire likely would have continued until the entire ship sank.
This problem can only be solved with a vessel with offshore
capability based in the Bay Area and available for fire fighting
{and perhaps towing, spill cleanup and oil storage) in waters off
of Central and Northern california.
2. Emergency offshore towing
this region is provided only
vessels of opportunity. The PUERTO RICAN nearly drifted ashore
before a tug that simply happened to be in the area was able to tow
it offshore.
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A

• dedicated vessel designed for offshore
be based
Bay Area and available for
no

RI

to

an regarding a location to which the PUERTO
imize danger to the environment.

A plan should be developed to identify offshore areas to
damaged or distressed vessels can be towed in order to reduce
risks
environmental damage.
4.
on
ni

Predictions of the oil spill movement failed to anticipate
current reversal. Lack of previous oceanographic research
currents and real-time information on spill location at
ctive effectiveness.

A research program is needed to develop a better understanding
circulation patterns in the Gulf of the Farallones and the rest
of central and northern california. Telemetry drifter buoys should be
utilized to track spill movement under poor visibility conditions.
5. Offshore cleanup capability was seriously limited by weather
and
pment availability. Much valuable time was lost in bringing
in equipment from out of the region. Difficulties were encountered
wi
chartered equipment refusing to respond in bad weather or being
too
from
site of the spill.
industry should be required to base its own offshore
vessel and barges in the Bay Area for quick response and should
develop plans for the staging of booms and other materials in areas
of high risk (e.g., harbor and river mouths, biologically sensitive
areas, etc.).
1 1on to apply oil dispersants was made in the absence of complete information regarding potential damage to the environment from oil or toxicity of the dispersed oil.

The state should develop a program to deterwdne the acute
and chronic toxicity of dispersants and dispersed oil, create a
library of information on dispersant effectiveness and toxicity,
and develop guidelines regulating conditions for dispersant applimonitoring •
. 7.
sunken stern continues to leak bunker fuel oil into
waters of the marine sanctuary and nearly half a million gallons of
additional oil product may also be in the stern.
The Coast Guard and/or the ship owner should be required
to
for• a survey of the stern, attempt to stop the leak(s)
and make recommendations regarding the remaining oil product on
board.
8.

Information on resources (organisms and habitats) at risk
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'

.

.

in the area was incomplete, resulting in
regarding protection strategies.

ion making

A detailed catalog and maps of resources, their
seasonality and sensitivity to
should be developed for
NOrthern and Central california, and computerized for ease
periodic revision (with the assistance of local resource
experts).
9. The direction of the movements of the PUERTO RICAN by the
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) required the presence of a
representative of the OSC at all times during the incident. At
one of the most critical periods of
incident, the OSC
representative was forced by weather conditions to leave the
scene and this is when the tug violated the Coast Guard
boundaries and the PUERTO RICAN sank.
In order to maintain total control of a pollution incident
and vessels involved in it, the On-Scene Coordinator must have a
representative present at all times.
It should be possible to
develop a systea for delegation of several representatives, or to
have a designated representative appoint a replacement if he must
leave the scene.
10. The tug towing the PUERTO RICAN crossed boundaries
establishing prohibited areas and spent almost half a day in
violation of Coast Guard orders, north and east of bounded areas.
There appear to have been no written
es of the orders
establishing these boundaries.
Procedures should be established to require that explicit
orders relating to Coast Guard intervention authority be in
writing and that copies of such orders be delivered to vessel
owners or their representatives and other interested parties.
The PUERTO RICAN explosion, fire, breakup and
components of a serious pollution incident.

sinkin~-were

all

However, the small number

of birds and mammals present in the Gulf of the Farallones during this
time of year minimized the environmental damage.
curred several months earlier, the

Had this incident oc-

ial damage to sea birds might

well have been severe, with perhaps an order of magnitude more birds on
been a few months later, tens of

S.E. Farallon Island: and if it

thousands of whales, elephant seals and Steller sea lions would have
been in the area.

This, combined with the relatively light oil pro-
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lled that did not persist on beaches and rocky, intertidal
areas, contributed great
occurred

to a much milder incident than might

a more typical crude oil product.

Despite the fact that the PUERTO RICAN incident was not a "worst
case" accident, the resulting damage and insurance claims may
well exceed $150 million.
The Coast Guard has already begun to revise its Oil Spill Contingency Plan, consistent with some of the recommendations made in this
report, and legislation has recently been enacted in the state which
will improve resource mapping and dispersant effectiveness research.
We hope that the recommendations presented here will be used to
further improve future responses to oil spills off the Central and
Northern California coast.
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I

HAVE COME TO

FACTUALLY ABOUT

CAPABILITY ON THE

CENTRAL COAST FOR THE CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP OF MARINE OIL SPILLS
I HAVE SOME FAMILIARITY WITH THAT SUBJECT BECAUSE I AM
MANAGER OF CLEAN SEAS, AN ORGANIZATION CREATED 15 YEARS AGO BY THE
OIL INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE JUST SUCH A CAPABILITY.
JUST A FEW WORDS OF BACKGROUND.
CLEAN SEAS CAME INTO BEING SHORTLY AFTER THE 1969 OIL SPILL
IN THE SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL -- WHICH HAD MADE IT ALL TOO APPARENT THAT --

.,J
AT THAT TIME --

THERE WAS REALLY NO

EFH:CTIVE WAY TO DEAL WITH LARGE

OIL SPILLS IN THE OPEN OCEAN.
THE OIL INDUSTRY -- PARTICULARLY THOSE COMPANIES OPERATING IN
THE CHANNEL -- IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE THE
CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL OFFSHORE OIL SPILL EMERGENCIES.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT OIL SPILL EMERGENCY,
TO DAY IS EXTREMELY REMOTE -- EVEN MORE SO IN VIEW OF INCREASINGLY MORE
STRINGENT OPERATING RULES AND CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED TECHNIQUES
AND TECHNOLOGY"
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IOUSLY NO OUTSIDE CONTRACTOR COULD AFFORD TO INVEST THE MILLIONS
AND

~1ILLIONS

OF DOLLARS REQUIRED TO DEVELOP AND t1AINTAIN A CLEANUP

CAPABILITY THAT WOULD SELDOM, AND POSSIBLY NEVER, BE USED.

FOR SUCH A

CAPABILITY TO BE AVAILABLE, THE OIL INDUSTRY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE IT.
CLEAN SEAS CAME INTO BEING.

WE PRESENTLY HAVE 16 MEMBER OIL COMPANIES

WHO CONTRIBUTE 4-5 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR.

IN A MOMENT WE WILL LOOK AT

WHAT CLEAN SEAS HAS BECOME -- 15 YEARS LATER.
BUT, FIRST, ANOTHER BIT OF BACKGROUND:
THE OIL INDUSTRY WAS CORRECT.

OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP

QUICKLY BECAME AN IMPORlANT ELEMENT IN THE FEDERAL APPROVAL PROCESS.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (WHICH EXERCISES JURISDICTION
AND CONTROL OVER DEVELOPMENT IN FEDERAL WATERS THROUGH THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE) AND THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (WHICH HAS ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT OFFSHORE OIL SPILLS ARE CLEANED UP) DEVELOPED
A

OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF ACTIVITIES AND

FACILITIES ON THE U.S. OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF.
AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE MOU GIVES THE COAST GUARD THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO REVIEW OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANS SUBMITTED TO MMS BY
PROSPECTIVE OFFSHORE OIL OPERATORS.
OF

THE CRITERIA TO JUDGE THE ADEQUACY

OIL SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATION. CLEANUP EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
-93-
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ARE JOINTLY SET BY MMS AND THE COAST
ESSENTIALLY,

I

JUST
THE VERY BEST THERE IS!
THE MOU ALSO ESTABLI
OF

MMS AND COAST GUARD

ICAL

A

EXPERTS

I

THE CONTINGENCY PLANS SUBMITTED.

IFI

1.

ADVISE WHETHER RESPONSE

GUARD

IA;

CRI

ADVI

ING

IPMENT ACTUALLY MEETS

CURRENTLY
2.

N

AND

ARE ADr:QUATE;
3.

ADVI

ING

PONSE TIME

LOCAL

I

4.

KEEP

OF NEW

SO AS
5.

IN SHORT, THE

EQUI
ACCORD

ISE

ICAL

PROVIDE

BY THE

IN

I Pf•1ENT

I

I

I

s

IS:

Y;

AND,

4

E CAPABILI

TO CONTAIN AND CLEANUP OIL SPILLS MAINTAINED BY
li

BY

AND

IS

UNDER ROUTINE SURVEI

PROFESSIONALS -- PROFESSIONALS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED IN THIS

S ECIFIC AREA OF EXPERTISE.

THEY HAVE ONLY ONE STANDARD OF ACCEPTANCE -

E BEST!
WI

THAT AS A BACKGROUND, LET'S LOOK AT THE OIL SPILL

CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP SITUATION TODAY ON THE CENTRAL COAST.
CLEAN SEAS' AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY REACHES FROM POINT MUGU ON THE
SOUTH, AND NORTH JUST ABOVE MORRO BAY.
BY

COAST GUARD REGULATION, UlL SPILL PROTECTION

w~s

SOURCE.

THE
IN

I

PLOY IT QUIC

N

RESPONSE EQUIPME

N

ARE RARE.

WOULD BE

I

IS

BUT THE OPERATORS AND

QUICKLY HANDLED ON THE SPOT, CLEAN

L
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R

INED

y.
IF THE I

SE

IP AND TAN

THE SMALL SPILLS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO HANDLE,

A FEW GALLONS OR A FEW BARRE
I

EACH PLATFORM, DRILL

PAGE 5
WE DO NOT HAVE THE TIME

LIST AND DESCRIBE

HAS ON HAND FOR RESPONSE

SPILLS, BUT SOt1E

HERE

THE
EXAMPLES

SEAS

P11ENT C

WOULD BE

INFORr1ATIVE.

ARE A FEW SLIDES TO SHOW THIS.
THE MAINSTAYS OF CLEAN SEAS' OFFSHORE

DESIGNED OIL SPILL RECOVERY VESSELS -- MR CLEAN-I

IALLY

I

-II

and

(CLEAN

SEAS IS ADDING MR CLEAN-111,180' VESSEL COMPLETELY EQUIPPED AS MR CLEAN-I
AND MR CLEAN-II ARE, ALONG WITH A 45' FAST RESPONSE BOOM BOAT TO REINFORCE
OUR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT IN THE SANTA MARIA BASIN.
VESSEL WILL BE KEPT IN THE

NITY OF

. ARGUELLO.)

THIS

MR CLEAN-I IS

MOORED IN SANTA BARBARA.
A SPEED OF 12 KNOTS, PLUS LARGE FUEL AND WATER CAPACITY,
THE SHIP TO
PERIODS

A
TIME.

ILL SITE QUICKLY AND REMAIN AT SEA
IT CARRIES ADVANCING SKIMMERS ON EITHER SIDE

AND IS CAPABLE OF CLEANING A 124-FOOT SWATH. THROUGH AN OIL

ICK ON EACH

THAT RECOVERY EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING IN EIGHT- TO
TEN-FOOT SEAS AND WINDS OF 20 KNOTS, WITH DEPLOYMENT ACCOMPLISHED IN
THE FIVE- TO SIX-FOOT RANGE.

THE COAST GUARD RECOGNIZES MR CLEAN-I

AS STATE OF THE ART.
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MR CLEAN-II, MOORED AT SAN LUIS BAY, IS SIMILAR TO MR CLEAN-I.
R

TIMEFRAME BETWEEN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TWO SHIPS, AN

SKIMMER,

OFFSHORE DEVICE, WAS DEVELOPED AND TESTED.

UNDER MANY

CONDITIONS, IT PROVED TO BE SUPERIOR TO EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND WAS,
THEREFORE, SELECTED FOR THE NEW VESSEL.
AND TESTING CONFIRMED ITS VALUE .

SEVERAL YEARS OF AT-SEA EXPERI

THEREFORE, IN KEEPING WITH ITS

RESPONSIBILITY, CLEAN SEAS REPLACED THE ORIGINAL SKIMMERS ON MR CLEAN-I WI
OFFSHORE DEVICES.
RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF CONTAINMENT BOOMS AT THE SPILL SITE
OF COURSE, THE EFFECTIVE WAY TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL DAMAGE.

IS,

TO

ACCOMPLISH THIS, CLEAN SEAS HAS TWO SPECIALLY DESIGNED

SPEED.

THIS RESPONSE TIME IS, IN MOST CASES, MANY TI11ES FASTER THAN

SPECIFIED IN COAST GUARD GUIDELINES.
IN ADDITION TO THE SKIMMERS MOUNTED ON MR CLEAN-I AND
MR CLEAN-II, CLEAN SEAS LISTS AN INVENTORY of 18 SKIMMERS OF VARIOUS
ILITIES AND DESIGNED FOR USE UNDER A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
THESE INCLUDE SELF-PROPELLED WEIR-TYPE UNITS INTENDED FOR HARBORS AND
PROTECTED WATERS;HYDRAULIC AND AIR-DRIVEN SKIMMERS, PRINCIPALLY USED
TO RECOVER OIL HELD BEHIND CONTAINMENT BOOMS; AND A CATAMARAN
-97-
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c

SKIMMING BARGE, TOWED WITH OIL
ING

SWATCH THROUGH

IL UNDER

A

TI

CLEAN SEAS' INVENTORY OF CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT TOTALS MORE THAN
45,000 FEET OF VARIOUS SIZED BOOMS DESIGNED FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS.

RANGE FROM MORE THAN

MILES OF LIGHT

BOOMS FOR HARBOR

THEY
ION; OVER

THREE MILES OF MEDIUM-HEAVY DUTY BOOM FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OFFSHORE AND

2~

MILES OF HEAVY-DUTY BOOM FOR CONTAINMENT IN MORE SEVERE SEA-STATES.
BOOMS ARE ALSO DEPLOYED AS DIVERSION BARRIERS FOR THE PROTECTI
SENSITIVE AREAS -- WETLANDS, SLOUGHS, R VER MOUTHS AND HARBORS.
SENSITIVE AREAS HAVE
HAVE BEEN I

BE~N

lUENTI~IED

BY

MA~INE

IVIOUALLY DEVELOPED FOR THE PROTECTION
GUARD GUIDELIN

EQUIPMENT IN OPEN
AT LEAST ONE HANDS-

SHOULD OCCUR AT
DRILL EACH

THESE DRILLS

ILED PLANS

EACH AREA.

ANNUALLY

AND THAT THERE BE

AS PART OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM.

TRAIN NEMBER

ARE FREQUENTLY OBSERVED AND MONI
PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THE

AND

SPECIFY THAT EXERCISES FOR DEPLOYING

ANNUALLY, CLEAN SEAS CONDUCTS SUCH DR
~10NTHL Y.

BIOLOGI

THESE

AND EXERCISES AT LEAST TW C
y

BY FEDERAL,

GUARD.

TO ATTEND THESE EXERCI
-98-

INSTEAD

EL.

THESE SESSIONS

AND LOCAL

ANY MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF IS INVI

IN ADDITION TO TRAINING, THESE DRILLS AND EXERCISES ARE USEFUL IN

NEW OR EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT.
THE COAST GUARD IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVALUATING THE OIL INDUSTRY'S
ABILITY TO CONTAIN AND CLEANUP OIL SPILLS IN THIS AREA.
TOTAL SYSTEM TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE IS

SUFF~CIENT

THEY EXAMINE
MIX IN

EQUIPMENT TO MEET THE VARIETY OF POTENTIAL EMERGENCIES -- AND THAT EACH
SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT IN THE MIX IS THE BEST AVAILABLE.

EVALUATI

IS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS.

IT IS THFTR

n~FICIAL

DUTY AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BE AWARE OF ADVANCES IN
IQUE AND TECHNOLOGY -- AND THEN BE SURE THESE ADVANCES ARE
ORPORATED INTO THE OIL INDUSTRY'S CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP CAPABILI
IN OFFICIAL REPORTS AND IN PUBLIC TESTIMONY, THE COAST GUARD GIVES
CL
WI

SEAS HIGHEST MARKS FOR ITS PROVEN ABILITY TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY
OCEAN EFFECTIVE EQUIPMENT.
THE COAST GUARDS POSITIVE EVALUATION OF CLEAN SEAS' CAPABILITY

I REINFORCED BY CONTINUOUS STUDIES CONDUCTED BY THE HIGHLY REGARDED
CONSULTING FIRM OF WOODWARD-CLYDE.

THEIR STAFF ARE SOME OF THE MOST

EXPERIENCED.AND INFORMED OIL SPILL CLEANUP EXPERTS IN THE WORLD.
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THEY FIRSTHAND, OBSERVED AND CRITIQUED CLEANUP

RATI

AT VIRTUA

OIL SPILL OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE, WORLDWIDE, FOR MORE THAN A DECADE.
KNOW WHAT WORKS AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS.

EVERY
THEY

AND THEY FORTHRIGHTLY

DESCRIBED CLEAN SEAS AS HAVING MORE OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP
CAPABILITY THAN ANY SIMILAR ORGANIZATION -- ANYWHERE.

THERE IS

QUESTION,

IN THEIR JUDGEMENT, OF CLEAN SEAS' ABILITY TO DEAL WITH OFFSHORE OIL SPILL
EMERGENCIES.
SO . . . . . THAT IS WHAT CLEAN SEAS IS TODAY-- AN EFFECTIVE,
TRAINED AND

PERIENCED ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH POTENTIAL
IVELY.

OIL SPILL EMERGENCIES, PROMPTLY AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN THIS STATUS IN

IT IS OUR FURTHER

E

I'LL CLOSE WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
IN OIL SPILL CLEANUP.

MOST OF US IN THIS FIELD FEEL THAT WE HAVE, PERHAPS,

VIRTUALLY REACHED THE UPWARD LIMITS OF OUR ABILITY TO CLEANUP OIL MECHANICALLY.
MOST OF THE RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE INDUSTRY,
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, AND BY OUTSIDE MANUFACTURERS ARE IN THE AREA OF
DRAMATICALLY IMPROVING OUR CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH OIL SPILLS CHEMICALLY
AND BIOLOGICALLY -- WITH NON-TOXIC DISPERSANTS AND ORGANISMS THAT WILL RENDER
HYDROCARBONS HARMLESS TO THE MARl

ENVIRONMENT.
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AT THE PRESENT TIME, OF COURSE, CLEAN SEAS IS ABLE TO APPLY
D SPE

TO OIL SLICKS BY SURFACE VESSELS, HELICOPTERS, STATIONED

OR BY A DC-4 THAT CAN BE ONSITE IN A FEW HOURS.

THIS TYPE OF CHEMI

APPLICATION IS AUTHORIZED BY REGULATORY AGENCIES NOW, ONLY WHEN OTHER
COVERY METHODS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE.

BUT AS RESEARCH CONT

AND POTENTIAL TOXICITY PROBLEMS ARE ELIMINATED, I PREDICT THAT MOST
FUTURE ADVANCES WILL BE MADE IN THIS VERY PROMISING FIELD.
BUT WHATEVER THE FUTURE HOLDS, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND CLEAN
WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST OIL SPI
E THAT SCIENCE AND PERSONAL DEDICATION CAN PROVIDE.
K

YOU.
+ +

+

+

+

+

+
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Statement
ility (CAORF)

Presented At

Oil and

A hearing under the
Senate Subcommi

Cali

on

- 0

a State

on and Background

CAORF is

to provide expert opinion and make
the issue of reducing the major risks of offshore oil

recovery operations. CAORF's area of expertise is in the appli
design and analysis methods using shiphandling simul

on.

The Computer Aided Operations Research Facility (CAORF) is a
government owned research facility under the direct management of
Maritime Administration, Department of Transportation. CAORF is located
on the grounds of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point,
York, and has been in operation since 1976. Most of CAORF
are performed on a cost reimbursable basis.

CAORF's

pri

research

tool

is

man-i

phandling simulation.

geographica 1 area

and

shiphandl

all

the

collision avoidance

very high degree

high

fidelity,

Virtually any

important

variables

that

and navigation can be simulated

accuracy and reallsm.

method can be summarized

as follows:

We

problems relating to the movement of ships and then permit practi
ship's Captains, Pilots, or Mates (the men-in-the-loop) to sail
mulated ship under a series of carefully designed, real is tic operati
condit ons. Data are recorded and analyzed, and results reported
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a

CAORF
worl

m

i i

n raw si

not

experience
world operational

Of parti

s

ion

rea

ems and needs.

ar

on is

on this

1980, the Cali

in

a

on was

The Santa Barbara Risk Management Program
joint sponsorship

the

Admini

ifornia

od 1

sponsor

was undertaken under the
the Maritime

Commiss on

ice

yiel

resul

ions

the

and permanent oil rigs and platforms relat

of

to the ship traffic lanes

Santa Barbara

What are the

or r1

associated w1

the rapid increase of

oil and

activities off the California coast? What

steps can be

reduce

li

From the
wi

?

to assi

are associ

increase in

of navigating

to areas where offshore oil

es are in

include Increased ri
other
and in some

ips

wi
an increase in the

s

vessel

ings.

wi

CAORF

is parti patlng

in

this hearing

because

we

believe

phandling simulation provides the best and most reliable method
assess these risks, and to assess the available risk reduction alternat
that will come under consideraton.

The advantage of man-in-the-loop simulation in risk assessment and i
the evaluation of the effectivness of alternative approaches to
reduction of risk is that this type of simulation

considers all of

elements comprising the marine transportation system.
which vessels

are

navigated

includes

the

The system

characteristics

of

the

environment, the channel or waterway geometry, aids to navigation, the
vessel, the operator, and many other elements such as traffic conditions
and schedule demands. Within this system, and in so far as
navigation is concerned, the human operator is the executive or primary
controller.

Consequently, when
contribute

simulation is used to assess the factors whi

or constrain safety, the man-machine systems perspective

plays a major role in shaping how the problem is viewed. For exampl
contributing to safety are any modifications to the system which result in
more reliable and predictably accurate vessel positioning (e.g., the use
precision electronic aids to navigation), or allows information to be more
easily assimilated and accurate decisions more easily made (e.g.,
marking of fixed offshore structures with RACONS).

Modifications that either constrain or contribute to safety can be
any component of the system: the environment ( such as the placement of
fixed structures in a traffic seperat ion zone); the information system
available to the mariner (such as the prov1s1on
mariner himself (such as training programs).
-105-

of a VTS), or to the

The problem that the

w

on

to eval
uat ion
opinions about the rel
changes are

ive

or, --or nove 1, even

accurately assess their impacts.
proposed
inc!

asses

a1

on

in the analysis. The operator,

Since safety of

l of

system 1s a function

elements, and the operator is the executive of the entire system,
ommision of any one el

ally the

can lead to incorrect

1ons.

eval

Ide a11y,

on

uations should

si

e

world is rarely a
J-mission, man-i
ising

a

world.
to conduct

loop

mulators become the most

ternat

s of
ovr.~:n·,mental

sk can

would be as follows: The

design alternatives, whether
modifi

if

and

to

be

A general

miti
ishment of a VTS,

gation, or

ni

are

on

ions that embody
traffic or fi

e increased
ners that wi 1 actual
then bring

exi

ated

lot
vesse 1 through

in

a

The

P lots or
it ons.

the
related

is
coll

a
alternatives can

compared

In addition to providing a foundation for a sci

re

if

ri

simulation has the added benefit of allowing experts
proposed system design modifications in operation. This places
in a much more informed position to base judgements as
modifications on
subjective observations

Indeed, a
the participating operational personnel i

every experiment

in
the risk management

mulation becomes a unique and val
by performing the diff cult

can
of available alternatives througr1

mulation.

can proceed to the evaluation of the various alternatives
other factors such as ease of implementation, user acceptance and
cost effect ivness.
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National Maritime
Kings Point, New
Computer Aided Operations Research Facility

"CAORF IN 60 SECONDS"

The Computer Aided Operations Research Facility ( CAORF) contains
the most sophisticated bridge simulator in the world today. Using
the simulator, we are able to safely and economically model the
marine world, expose ship officers to marine problems, and record
performance as they act out their solutions to these problems.
The heart of the facility is the simulated bridge containing real
bridge equipment (such as radars, steering stand, communications
equipment). The bridge is surrounded by a massive circular screen
on which is projected a computer-generated image of the area in
which the ship is sailing. A wide varie
of ship models ranging
from tankers to nuclear submarines can be used in simulation.
a behind CAORF is simple.
We model problems involving
shi
ling
then permit actual captains/pilots to sail the
CAORF ship under realistic environmental conditions to observe the
effects on human performance.
Data are recorded and analyzed to
permit objective decisions to be made concerning the adequacy of
designs or the feasibility of different operating conditions.
Proposed dredging designs can
optimized (as in Norfolk),
equipment requirements evaluated (as with Collision Avoidance
Systems), shiphandling experience provided (as with u.s. Navy
TRIDENT submarines) and training methodologies studied (as with
maritime cadets and tugboat operators).
1 of this can
accomplished from the safety of the simulator before des ns are
implemented in the real world.
i

90 .. 2

October 1985

(
Statement before the Senate Subcommittee
on Oil and Gas Development Hearing held on November, 1985
at the University of California, Santa Barbara
It seems inevitable that the subject of risk is raised in connection
the
ng development of oi 1 resources offshore the Santa Barbara
ion.
It is after all in the interest of each party that risks be minimized.
their part, the oil industry can certainly be counted on to exert their very
considerable engineering skills toward that end; the minimization of
sk is a
major responsibility of their engineering staffs and they possess considerable
know-how in this business by now. The State of California and local communies have no less interest in risk avoidance, as the fact of this Hearing
attests. And, of course, Federal government agencies have specific responsibilities for offshore risk avoidance.
My own experience in the consideration and study of complex engineering
questions is that lengthy and involved deliberations ensue, often lasting
years. These are often limited in their conclusions by the imperfect state of
ng knowledge, by the particular knowledge and capability of these
experts who can be assembled at the time, and the results are often unsatisfactory, unclear, and the subject of contention. I think this could often be
the case here, where you are ultimately concerned with questions such as ship
collision probability, the consequences of collision or other causes of
structural failure, or of fire, of other environmental hazards, etc. You are
here, fortunately enough, discussing risk before the event, but tragically
enough, these studies are often carried out in the aftermath of accident,
usually unforeseen, and the resolution is further hampered by an atmosphere of
suspicion and blame, by considerations of legal and financial responsibility,
and by urgent clamors for .remedial action and legislation.
Given these facts, it seems to me that it is very much in the interest
- industry
government, to seek far-sighted
sms
scussions
engineering risk avoidance and, particularly, the
consequences of accident.
With regard to the engineering and sci
fie
aspects,
ons would very much improve the present situation:
1.)

that the State of California bring into being a small but
adequate, and focussed expertise (Center of Expertise)
on the engineering questions involved, and

2.)

nuous
ica1 contact and even cooperation ensue
between State, Industry, and Federal government engineers
and scientists.

I

have earlier proposed that such a South-Central Coast Center of
se be established at UCSB, based on existing and growing faculty
lity, to emphasize:
ship and platform safety and reliability
environmental effects in the coastal zone

-lU':J-

cca 1
hore ·
scient if

This Center would serve
and Federal Agencies. Its
collect and evaluate
programs related to its major s

ng the effect of oil

ies,

Jt onal

environmental 1
and structural
maneuverabili
and co11i ion avoi
capsizing and mooring
wave and current effects on
shore and shore
waste disposal and pollution in the coastal zones
incl

s

spi 11 s

it es

technology for abatement.

Such a Center would be unique in Cali
ia, and perhaps in the U.S. It
has an antecedent in the large Norwegian
re Technology
h Program
funded by all participants in the Norwegian sector North Sea exploitation.
Each of the State of California, the Federal Government, and the Offshore
Oil Industry should be interested in such a Center of Expertise. The State
(and local governments)
they will badly need the
se in the long
run as an aid to governance and legislation and in
ing with emergencies
(think of the long and expensive fire in the Mexican sector of the Gulf); the
Federal Government
have re
ibility for inspection and
1 i cens i ng of offshore structures and operations (the Coast Guard and the
Geological Survey); the Offshore Oil Indus
because of their interest in
persuing long-term exploitation in the South-Central Coast in harmony
th
public, state, local, and federal agencies and nterests.
Whatever the form such far-s i
measures as proposed above might
eventually take, I urge the State as well as the other interested parties to
begin implementing
now so they can serve their purpose when the need
arises.

hall P
Presi
i a1

sor,

Professor Marshall Tulin has held
President al Chair at UCSB since 1982,
the University's first endowed chair.
has been a member of the National
Academy of Engineering s nee 1979 and was the Founder and
Chairman of
Hydronautics, Incorporated, a prominent and pioneering engineeri
firm in the
field of Ocean Engineering.
is a former member of the Marine Board of the
National Research Council,
served the Federal Government in various
scientific capacities, and is currently a member of the California Sea Grant
Committee.
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TEST MONY TO SENATE SUBCOMMI
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APPLICATION OF

ANALYSIS

RE 0 L AND GAS OPERAT
BY

PROFESSOR FLOYD R.
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

TULER
WORCESTER, MA

WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS

0 609

USE OF R

RNING

N OFFSHORE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ABROAD.
M.

.

.

YSIS
•

THESE COMMENTS COME FROM A

Al

RCH

ABOUT FOUR YEARS AGO SUPPORTED BY THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT

SERVICE THROUGH A CONTRACT FROM SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES.
AND OPIN ONS ARE SOLELY M NE AND THOSE OF MY CO-WORKERS:
ILL, GEORGE

AND DAV D CHENEY.

IAL AND THE LIM TAT ONS OF

OF

ING RI

ANLAYS S IN OFFSHORE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SUGGEST
I

POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY GOVERNMENTAL AGENCI
RATORS AND

S

R PARTI

BE USED BY REGULATORY
R

RCEMENT OF EXIST!

RED OR

I

FSHORE

IES
SAFETY

SHING

REMENTS AND
D

INTE

AL PROBLEMS.

DEVELOPMENT OFF THE CAL

FO

EXAMPLE

RNIA COAST MIGHT BE
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MPROVED BY STUDI

AND

THE POT NliAL

CON~L[=rs

BETWEEN OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES AND

SH[~P!NG

ION.

N

~ET0!00S

CAN ALSO BE USED FOR REEXAMINING EXISTING REQUIREMENiS

TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE ACHIEVING THEIR GOALS AND THERE HAVE
BEFN INSTANCES WHERE A RISK ANALYSIS HAS LED TO THE ELIMINATION OF AN
EXISTING REGULATION.

FOR EXAMPLE,

A NORWEGIAN STUDY SHOWED THAT

OVERALL RISK WAS LOWERED BY NOT REQUIRING STAND-BY SHIPS FOR NORTH
PLATFORMS.

S~A

PREVIOUSLY, STAND-BY SHIPS HAD BEEN MANDATED.

PRIVATE OPERATORS, SUCH AS OIL COMPANIES.

DRILLING CONTRACTORS,

EQUIPMENT DESIGNERS AND SYSTEM FABRICATORS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER
EXPANDING THEIR USE OF PROBABALISTIC METHODS IN THEIR STUDIES OF THE
HAZARDS OF NEW SYSTEMS THEY PROPOSE TO USE.

THIS PRACTICE

CO~D

HELP

MAKE THEIR DESIGNS AND OPERATIONS SAFER AND LESS COSTLY IN THE LONG
RUN

FOR THEMSELVES,

FOR WORKERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

FURTHERMORE,

IN

ADD

ION TO SIMPLY PRESENTING RESULTS, PUBLISHING THE ASSUMPTIONS AND

METHODS OF SUCH STUDIES WOULD PERMIT CRITICAL EVALUATION AND COULD
HELP ALLAY PUBLIC CONCERNS ABOUT OFFSHORE HAZARDS.

!NALLY, PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD
BE ALERT TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT GREATER USE OF THESE FORMAL
METHODS OF

ANALYSI~'MAY

PRESENT TO THEM.

IF PROPERLY USED, SUCH

METHODS OFFER THE HOPE OF BETTER CONTROL OF LOW-PROBABILITY,

HIGH-

CONSEQUENCE EVENTS OF THE SORT THAT SO OFTEN MOTIVATE OPPOSITION TO
OFFSHORE AND OTHER MAJOR PROJECTS.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR SUCH GROUPS ro

LEARN HOW RISK ANALYSIS WORKS AND HOW IT IS USED, SO
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TH~Y

MAY BECOME

PART IC Pi4NTS

WE SHOULD REALIZE

s

ANALYS

RI

MANAGEMENT OF ANY ASPECT OF
AND I

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR USE

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS.
IMPOSING A REQU

FULL AWARENESS

THERE

TO

TS

L

FU

OPER~HDRS

FORMAL RISK ANALYSI

IS.

AT THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART OF
IN THE UNITED

R

S~<

I GlUE Al\iD

ANAL YS S

1

TS PRACTI

SHOULD

R USE IN UNUSUAL C

tJSE:

ISK ANALYSIS HAS

DECIS ON MAKERS ON LOW-PROBAB
R 81-<

AN~=IL YS

IGH-CONSEQUENCE

I

8 OR ENTED TOWARD

I

UNREASONABLE TO

XPECT

I

I

CAN SUBSTI

I FWNMENTAL

I

MOST CATAST
APPROACHES CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS BE

GHCJUU> BE

COIYJPLEMENH~

I

I

L.

ANALYS S OF PROBABILI I

1

Y USED.

FROM THE DETERMINIST C METHODS THAT
ISI

TO

EFFECT I

USE

v

THE UNDESIREABLE CONSEQUENCES OF
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT

FACT
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FS

EQUAL Y

DAM~GING.

EH

CONS DER MORE

F~R-R~ACHING

CHANGES

N

RY SYSTEM THAT WOULD TAKE ADVANYAGE OF THE POWER OF FORMAL
ANALYSIS.

USED PROPERLY.

RISK

ANALYS~S

CAN ALLOW FOR MURE

IVE REGULA ION OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENYAL RISKS WHILE ALLDWl
lN

rRY GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND

OPERATIONAL METHODS,

AND WHILE ASSIGNING MORE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY

EFFEC IVE CONTROL OF HAZARDS TO THE OPERATING COMPANIES.
BE DONE BY ADAPTING THE SELF-REGULATION APPROACH KNOWN IN NORWA
AS

INTERNAL CONTROL'',

OR BY REQUIRING THAT OPERATORS ADOPT A FORMAL

ROGRAM OF QUALITY ASSURANCE.

'\
UNDER THE SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CONTROL,

OPERATORS MUST FULFILL A SET OF

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY MANGEMENT THAT SUBSTITulE
THE ESrABLISriMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DETAILED DESIGN AND OPERATlNG
BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES.
~4DPROACHES

TO REGULATION,

AS COMPARED WITH MORE TRADITIONAL

THIS SYSTEM INVOLVES SUBSTAI'lT IALL Y LESS DAY-

OVERSIGHT OF COMPANY OPERATIONS BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES WHILE
TRENGTHENING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF OPERATORS FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF
ACTIVITIES THROUGH FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.
TODAY,

CLEARLY,

AS WE HAVE

THE R~~ID INCREASE IN OFFSHORE ACTIVITY EXPECTED IN SAN

BARBARA W LL OVERTAX THE REGULATORY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AGENCIES
REGULAriONS REQUIRE FEWER REGULATORY STAFF THAN ARE NEEDED IF
EVERY INSTALLATION IS DIRECTLY SUPERVISED BY GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTRT VES.

NEVERTHELESS,

ALL OFFSHORE DESiGNS
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AN~

OPERATIONS

WOULD REIYiAIN SUBJECT TO RANDOM SPOT CHECKS BY 1-=IUTHDRITIEEl.

FORMAL ANALYSIS OF RISK PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN DETERM NING WHETHE
PROPOSED DESIGN IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OVERALL LEVELS OF ACCEPTABLE
FORTH BY THE REGULATING AGENCY.
OF

Nl

RNAL CONTROL REQUIRES THAT A

SP~ClFlED

SO THAl

EFFECTIVE USE OF THE

LEVEL OF ACCEPTABLE RISK

HE OPERATORS CAN SHDW THA)

lHEY

STEPS NECESSARY TO DESIGN AN ACCEPTABLE SYSTEM AND OPERAT
HOWEVER,

ESTABLISHING A LEVEL OF ACCEPTABLE RISK HAS PROVEN TU BE

E CONTROVERSIAL IN NORWAY FOR OFFSHORE REGULATION AND
FUR REGULATING SUCH

rECHNOLOGIES AS NUCLEAR POWER.

N THE U.S.

WHETHER AN

ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK C0N BE ESTABLISHED FOR OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES

N

THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL REGIONS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED.

N SUMMARY,
[UENII

THE USE OF RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES AS A TOOL FOR

Y1NG AND MI

H OPPDRTUNI
ACT

IGATING HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE

IES AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR ALL PARTIES
'v' J. T

ES.

CONCERN~D

INCREASED USE OF THESE TECHNIQUES CAN

MAKE OFFSHORE OPERATIONS SAFER.
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TU

CALIFORNIA SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT

CLAIR GHYLIN
GENERAL MANAGER
WESTERN REGION LAND DEPARTMENT
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.

NOVEMBER 4, 1985
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CHEVRON'S POINT ARGUELLO PROJE
CALIFORNIA IS A STUDY OF STR

EN

H

GLES AND CO

RATION

BETWEEN INDUSTRY, LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERA

EN

AGENCIES, AND PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,

THE E GR

HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE MYRIAD PERMITTIN
JURISDICTIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN

THAT HAVE
1

STOOD TN THE WAY OF DEVELOPING CALIFORNIA S
RESOURCES,

THE PERMITTING AND JURISDICTION

SHORE
OVE

AP

HAVE BEEN CREATED BY A NUMBER OF SINGLE ISSUE FEDERA
LAWS PASSED IN THE LA

HJO DECADES,

INCLUDIN

THE OCS LANDS AcT AND ITS AMENDMENTS
T OF 1 q

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
MARINE SANCTUARIES AcT OF 1977
CoASTAL ~ONE MANAGEMENT

T OF

ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT OF 1973
(LEAN WATER AcT AS AMEN ED TN 19

-ll -

2

As A RES

T OF THIS, AT LE ST 8 FEDER

ST ISSUE A ROV

ENCIE

S BEFORE EXPLORATION AND PRO

CTION

ACTIVITIES CAN BEGIN.
lN ADDITION THERE ARE A NUMBER OF STATE AND L
LA

THAT GOVERN AND PERMITS THAT ARE REQUIRED.

FACT,

IN

E NUMBER OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN EITHER ISSUING

A PERMIT, APPROVAL OR CERTIFICATION OR IN REVIEWING AND
COMMENTING ON OCS ACTIVITIES INCREASES AS THOSE
TIVITIES MOVE FROM THE EXPLORATORY PHASE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION STAGES.
(

IFO

FoR INSTANCE, IN

A SOME OF THE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE OCS

PROCESS ARE:
IN THE ExPLORATION PHASE, STATE AGENCIES INCLUDE
H 0FFI E OF p

NING AND RESEA

H, COAST

(OMMISSI N

AND LOCAL AGENCIES INCLUDE CoUNTY AIR PoLLUTION
DISTRICTS.
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\

BuT WHEN WE GET TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
PHASES THEN STATE AGENCIES INVOLVED ARE:

OFFICE OF

PLANNING AND RESEARCH, COASTAL COMMISSION, STATE LANDS
COMMISSION, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, STATE WATER
REsouRcEs CoNTROL BoARD, DEPARTMENT oF CoNSERVATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

LOCAL AGENCIES INCLUDE

CoUNTY AIR POLLUTION DISTRICTS, REGIONAL WATER 0UALITY
CoNTROL BoARDS, CITY PLANNING DEPARTMENTS, PuBLIC WoRKS
DEPARTMENTS, CITY AND CoUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENTS, AND
PoLICE DEPARTMENTS,
IN 1081 THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORTED TO
CONGRESS ON THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS DURING THE
EXPLORATORY AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE AND MADE THE
FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
nTHE OuTER CoNTINENTAL SHELF POTENTIALLY CAN
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'
. I

PROVIDE THE NATION WITH SIGNIFICANT FUTURE OIL AN
GAS RESOURCES.

BuT, THE FULL POTENTIAL WILL NOT

BE REALIZED UNLESS:
VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED ISSUE
PERMITS AND COMPLETE OTHER AUTHORIZATION
ACTIONS WITHIN A STANDARD, REASONABLE TIME
WHICH

GAO

BELIEVES SHOULD BE A MAXIMUM OF

DAYS.
COASTAL STATES ARE ENCOURAGED TO DEVELOP
PROCESSES FOR LOCAL REVIEWS AND ISSUING
PERMITS WHICH ARE MORE TIMELY AND UNIFORM
WITH FEDERAL PROCESSES,
CREDIBILITY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
PROCESS IS MORE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED TO
MINIMIZE CHALLENGES AND DELAYS ...

WE

11

ARE NEARING COMPLETION OF THE PERMITTING
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90

TH

PROCESS FOR OUR PoiNT ARGUELLO OFFSHORE PRO E
1

PT. ARGUELLO PROJECT INCLUDES CHEVRON S PLATFORM
HIDALGO -

SW

56 SLOTS IN 430' OF WATER LOCATED 5 5 MI ES

OF PT. ARGUELLO -TEXACO's PLATFORM HARVEST -

SLOTS IN

570'

0

OF WATER AND CHEVRON 1 S PLATFORM HERMOSA -

48 SLOTS - IN 60?' OF WATER; TWO SUBSEA PIPELINES
CONNECTING THE PLATFORMS AND THEN GOING ONSHORE AT
PoiNT CONCEPTION THEN ON TO THE PROCESSING F
AT GAVIOTA.

ILITIES

THIS IS THE FIRST MAJOR OFFSHORE PROJECT

TO GO THROUGH THE ENTIRE PERMITTING PROCE
GAO 1981 REPORT TO CoNGREss.

SINCE T E

I THINK IT wouLD BE

INTERESTING TO SEE HOW WE ARE DOING.
FIRST. FEDERAL PERMIIS.

THE COMPTROLLER GENER

THINKS THE FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD COMPLE

THEIR

AUTHORIZATION WITHIN A STANDARD REASONAB E TIME--A
MAXIMUM OF 90 DAYS,
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IN J

Y, 19

D ELOPME

, CHEVRON BEGAN FORMAL PREPARATION

AND PROD

TION PLAN AND ENVIR

F

M T

REPORT (DPP/ER) AND OIL SPILL AND EMERGENCY CONTINGENC
PL

AND IN DECEMBER, 1982, THEY WERE SUBMITT

TO THE

M NERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE,
MORE THAN 90 DAYS LATER, IN MAY, 1983, THE PLAN
THE MMS.

DEEMED COMPLETE

THE DPP/ER IS READY
D DETAILE

Z E AN

THIS IS NOT AN

BE PUT THROUGH SEVERAL EXTENSIV

E lEW PR

ESSES MANDATED BY THE COAST

EMENT AcT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL P I Y

T THE C iFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QuALI

AcT AND B

LOCAL COASTAL PLANS.
AT THI
F

TIME

CHEVRON BEGAN SUBMITTING TO THE

REVIEW AND APPROVAL DETAILED STRUCTURAL PLANS AND

SPECIFICATIONS FOR PLATFORM HERMOSA AND ASSOCIATED
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PIPELINES.

THIS IS AN ONGOING PR

ESS

N

AT THE DESIGN PHASE, FABRICATION PHASE
PHASE.

THESE PLANS MUST BE APPROVED

A

D IN T LAT
T E

MMS

PLATFORM HERMOSA CAN BE TRANSPORTED TO THE INS
SITE.

EF
L

I N

APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN OTHER PLANS RELATED TO

ACTUAL OPERATIONS fSAFETY, COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSPORTATION, TRAINING, ETC.) MUST BE S MITTED AND
APPROVED BY THE
THE PLATFORM.

MMS

BEFORE OPERATI

S CAN COMMENCE

N

FINALLY, A SEPARATE APPLICATION FOR A

PERMIT TO DRILL MUST BE FILED WITH THE

MMS

FOR E

WELL TO BE DRILLED FROM THE PLATFORM.
OTHER AREAS OF DIR

T INVOLVEMENT WITH THE

THE PERMITTING PROCESS INCLUDED:
V UATION AND PROD

TION ALL

APPROVAL

ROYA

ATION METHODS, APPR

OF PIPELINES' LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM, APPROVAL
o·IL AND NATURAL GAS METERING

STEMS, ISSUANCE OF
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AL
W

R GHTS
A 0

WAY FOR PIPELINES ON THE OCS AND APPROV
EVACUATI

D SHELTERING PLANS INVOLVING

ANDENBERG MISSLE AND SHUTTLE LAUNCHES,
IN MAY. 1985, THE MMS SENT THE PLAN CDPP/ER) TO
E CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION FOR CONSISTENCY
REVIEW PURSUANT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AcT.
AT AB

T THIS TIME, WE BEGAN PREPARING AND FILING

APPLICATIONS FOR PERMITS AND APPROVALS FROM OTHER
FEDERAL AGENCIES:

CoRPS OF ENGINEERS, ENVIRONMENTAL

PRoTECTION AGENCY. CoAST GuARD. FEDERAL AviATION
ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION AND
THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY CoMMISSION,

NoNE OF

THESE AGENCIES CAN ISSUE THEIR PERMITS AND APPROVALS
NTIL AFTER NEPA/CEQA REVIEW PROCESS IS COMPLETE AND
MMS HAS GIVEN FINAL APPROVAL TO THE PLAN (DPP/ER),
IN OcTOBER, 198), THE 59-wEEK JOINT FEDERAL/sTATE
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s
E

c

(

MT

IO

H

S

R

N

)

s

E

As
PERMITS, THE R 0

STATE AND

L

CONGRESS RECOMMENDED nCOASTAL

S

TES ARE ENCOURAGED TO DEVELOP PROCESSES FOR L

R

IE

D ISSUI

PERMITS WHICH ARE MORE TIM

UNIFORM WITH FEDERAL PROCESSES.n
RS

TATE CoAST

WE WERE ABLE TO

COMMISSION AND SANTA BARBARA

COUNTY PERMITS SIM
A LOT

AND

TANEOUSLY WITH THE FEDERAL PERMITS

TIME WAS SAVED.

ST1

THE OVERLAP AND

LICATION IS B GLING.
IN No EMBER 1983, THE CoASTAL CoMMISION GRANTED
CONSI TE

CERTIFICATION

TION PLAN FOR
BE

SUBMITTED

CONSISTENC

OR THE DEVELOPMENT AND

E FIRST PLATFORM.

THE PLAN HAD

THE CALIFORNIA CoASTAL CoMMISSION FOR

CERTIFICATION BY THE MMS ON MAY 19, 1983.

THE COASTAL Co

SSION HELD PUBLIC HEARINGS ON JULY
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TH, AuGusT 7 o,
F

ER

EPTE

N
ESS

E u

AN

R IEW

PR

-M
T,

L

T
ORM

PLA

N

N

THE FIELD, T

)

v

A SING E
TH

E
p

LA

R

E CoAs A CoM

T ANSMITTED

CONCU

M

N

R 0 SI

BE
THE

0
E

TS

s
T N

RTA I

B B

UN

0

M Y CONCERNS

RE~ARDING

1) TRANPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL'

MARINE RESOURCES, )) COMMERCI

FISHING; 4) CRUDE

OIL SPILLS; 5) VESSEL TRAFFIC SAFETY; 6) AIR QUAL!

7) VISU

AND SCENIC RESOURCES; AND 8) PUBLIC WELFARE.

OF THE ISSUES RELATED TO THE ALTERNATIVE OF USING
TANKERS TO MOVE CRUDE OIL TO REFINERIES,

By

SUBSTITUTING A PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, THE
CoMMISSION FELT THAT THE ADVERSE IMPACTS ASSOCIATED
WITH TANKER USE HAD BEEN MITIGATED.
FoR VESS
PL

EMENT

TRAFFIC SAFETY, WE COMMITTED TO THE
AN AUTOMATIC RADAR PLOTTING AID ON

p A ORM HERMOSA,

THE COST HERE IS NOT SIGNIFICANT,

BUT THE OPERATIONAL COST OF MANNING IT 24 HOURS PER
, IN ADDITION TO PROBLEMS CREATED BY ITS NOT HAVING
BEEN DESIGNED IN THE OPERATIONS ROOM CREATED
SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN REFORMATTING THE CONTR

-1~~-

S

T

T

E
y

FoR HE

EAN

OF OIL SPILLS, WE

E A ESS

Q

A

R NEAR

MR.

iL

E SITE

PLATF

S N

LUDE ANNU

CLEAN

AND STATI

M HERMOSA,

0 IMATELY $1 S MI

T

OMMITTED TO

THIS WLL

TO $2 MILLION.

OPERATING COSTS.

THE WHOLE PERMITTING PROCESS HAS REEN LO

so

BT

IGHTENING AND E

THE FIRST FAVORA
TH

AST

E

TI AT I

E

THE

OWED 5

Co A

AL Co

M J R AREAS OF E
RECEDEN ED S
F OM THE CIT
SOR

AND

RAGING

CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION FROM

F

OMMISSI
WiT

THIS

IRONMENT
0

NTH

OF I

ISSI

ND ITS STA

CONCERN,

IN F

OF SANTA BARBARA, THE (

THE PROJECT
NTY BOARD OF

MBERS OF THE STATE LEGI

THE STATE ADMIN STRATION, THE DEPARTMENT
D ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERS.
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C TIN ING THROUGH THIS DATE, WE HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH
LEADERS,

FISHERMEN AND NATIVE

AMERICANS, VISTA DEL MAR ScHOOL BOARD, CITIZEN GROUPS
rsucH AS CITIZENS PLANNING ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
CENTER), LOCAL LANDOWNERS, THE REGIONAL WATER QuALITY
CoNTROL BoARD, CouNTY HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT.
uN

BuiLDING AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT. CouNTY RoADS

DEPARTMENT (IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR MEETINGS WITH
C TRANS FOR OUR PROPOSED OVERPASS), THE LOCAL
CALIFORNIA STATE PARK AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT, AND
FISH AND GAME.
AFTER OUR APPLICATION WAS DEEMED COMPLETE BY THE
COUNTY, IT TRIGGERED A )0-WEEK ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
PERIOD.

THE LAW CALLS FOR A 5?-WEEK REVIEW PERIOD;

HOWEVER, CHEVRON CONSENTED TO AN ADDITIONAL SEVEN-WEEK
EXTENSION TO ALLOW FOR BOTH THE PUBLIC AND THE CouNTY
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DECEMBER lR, 1984

ED THE PROJECT

THE PROJECT APPROVAL CARRIED WITH IT OVER 160 PERMIT
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..,,,,,,...,.,,...., S HEAVY

l

OTHER MATERIALS, SUCH AS NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS (NGL),
THE OIL, SO THAT IT WILL FLOW MORE EASI

THROUGH

BARBARA COUNTY IS REQUIRING THAT THIS BLENDING WITH NGL
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PIPELINE SYSTEM {KNOWN AS THE

~==

WE BELIEVE THIS PROCESS PRESENTS A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS
HAZARD.

NGLS ARE HIGHLY VOLATILEs AND ANY PIPELINE BREAKAGE

TO A CRITICAL INCIDENT.

WE ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT THE

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS BE DISCUSSED AND PLANNED FOR EARLY
FOR EXAMPLE, THE ANGELES PIPELINE, A HEW SEGMENT
PIPELINE SYSTEM, WILL BE 130 MILES LONG AND Will
CITIES AND 18

OF UNINCORPORATED COUNTY AREAS.
SOUND. AND CONSIDERATION MUST BE
AREAS ALONG

IN DENSELY

l
SOUTHERN

A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE.

FORNIA

PREPARED FOR THE GOVERNOR S
1

9

NGL IS SUCH A

A SCENARIO WAS DEVELOPED
REPORT INDICATED THAT

TASK FORCE ON
AN EARTHQUAKE OF
THE EVENT OF SUCH A

PIPELINE FACILITIES WOULD PROBABLY SUSTAIN VARYING DEGREES OF DAMAGE
THE PROXIMITY TO THE ACTUAL FAULT LINE AND THE STABILITY
-146-

MANAGEMENT. UNLIKE OFFSHORE

,IT

A PIPELINE ACCIDENT, INDIVIDUAl

OR COUNTIES

SITUATION
EXPERIENCES OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT.
, AWARENESS AND GOOD, QUICK COMMUNICATION ARE THE
ACTION.

WORK TOGETHER ALMOST AS A nPIPELINE MANAGEMENT
, PREPARING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TEAMS OF
INATING WITH

Oil COMPANI

STATE OFFICIALS.

MANAGEMENT, I WOULD

TO IN

ENHANCE lOCAl GOVERNMENTS ABILITY TO COORD
ACTUALLY

IN

SACRAMEHTOt AND

MANAGEMENT

COMMITTEE I HAVE FORWARDED

IDEA IN THIS "'-"'"'"''

THE EFFECT

SPEAK AT
QUESTIONS ..
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